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MAXIMIN SHARE ALLOCATIONS ON CYCLES
ZBIGNIEW LONC AND MIROSLAW TRUSZCZYNSKI
ABSTRACT. The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social
choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to
allocate goods to agents so that each agent’s bundle forms a connected subgraph. For the maximin
share fairness criterion researchers proved that if goods form a tree, allocations offering each agent a
bundle of at least her maximin share value always exist. Moreover, they can be found in polynomial
time. We consider here the problem of maximin share allocations of goods on a cycle. Despite
the simplicity of the graph, the problem turns out to be significantly harder than its tree version.
We present cases when maximin share allocations of goods on cycles exist and provide results on
allocations guaranteeing each agent a certain portion of her maximin share. We also study algorithms
for computing maximin share allocations of goods on cycles.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice [5, 3]. It assumes
a set of elements, referred to as goods, and a collection of agents each with her own utility function
on the sets, or bundles, of goods. The utility functions are commonly assumed to be additive and
so it is enough to specify their values on individual goods only. The objective is to assign to agents
disjoint subsets of goods in a way that meets some fairness criteria. Among the most commonly
studied ones are proportionality and envy-freeness, adapted to the case of indivisible goods from
the problem of fair allocation of divisible goods or cake-cutting [5, 11], as well as recently proposed
maximin and minimax share [6, 4]. For each of the criteria, it is of interest to identify classes of
instances when fair allocations exist, to establish the complexity of deciding the existence of fair
allocations, and to design algorithms for computing them.
In this paper, we focus on the maximin share criterion [6]. It is a relaxation of envy-freeness
and proportionality, and has a natural interpretation in terms of some allocation protocols. In a few
years since it was first proposed it has already received substantial attention. The criterion turns
out to be highly non-trivial. First, while it is easy to see that envy-free and proportional allocations
do not always exist, it is not at all clear whether the same is true for the less restrictive maximin
criterion. We now know it is. But it took a few years before the first examples showing that maximin
share allocations are not guaranteed to exist were found [12]. Moreover, they turned to be quite
intricate. Further, the complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations has not yet
been determined [4]. To get around the difficulty of constructing maximin allocations, researchers
proposed to relax the maximin share criterion by requiring that the value of each agent’s share in
an allocation be at least equal to some positive fraction of the maximin share. Procaccia and Wang
[12] proved that an allocation guaranteeing agents at least 2/3 of their maximin share always exists,
and that it can be found in polynomial time if the number of agents is fixed (not part of input).
Both the result and the algorithm are based on deep combinatorial insights. Building on that work,
Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad and Saberi [1] proved that for every constant ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 2/3, there
is a polynomial-time algorithm finding an allocation guaranteeing to each agent at least (2/3−ǫ) of
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their maximin share (with the number of agents a part of the input). Ghodsi, Hajiaghayi, Seddighin,
Seddighin and Yami [8] proved that in the results by Procaccia and Wang and by Amanatidis et al.,
the constant 2/3 can be replaced with 3/4.
We study maximin share allocations of indivisible goods in the setting proposed by Bouveret,
Cechla´rova´, Elkind, Igarashi and Peters [2]. In the original problem, there are no restrictions on
sets of goods that can be allocated to agents. This ignores important practical constraints that may
make some sets highly undesirable. For instance, goods may be rooms and labs in a building to
be allocated to research groups [2], or plots of land to be consolidated [9]. In such cases, legal
sets of goods that could be allocated to an agent might be required to form connected subgraphs
in some graph describing the neighborhood relation among goods (offices spanning segments of a
hall, plots forming contiguous areas of land).
Bouveret et al. [2] studied envy-free, proportional and maximin share allocations for that setting
obtaining several interesting complexity and algorithmic results. Our paper extends their study for
the maximin share criterion. In a striking positive result, Bouveret et al. [2] proved that maximin
share allocations of goods on trees always exist and can be found in polynomial time. In our work
we look beyond trees and show that as soon as the underlying graph has a single cycle, the picture
becomes much more complicated. Our main contributions are as follows.
1. We show that for goods on a cycle the maximin share value for an agent can be computed in
polynomial time. In two cases, whenm ≤ 2n and when agents can be grouped into a fixed number
of types (agents are of the same type if they have the same utility function), this allows us to design
polynomial time algorithms for computing maximin share allocations of m goods (on cycles) to n
agents or determining that such allocations do not exist.
2. We show that deciding the existence of maximin share allocations of goods on an arbitrary
graph is in the class∆P2 . For complete graphs (the setting equivalent to the original one) this result
improves the bound given by Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [4]. We further improve on this upper bound
for cycles and more generally, unicyclic graphs by showing that for such graphs the existence of a
maximin share allocation is in NP.
3. We obtain approximation results on the existence of allocations of goods on a cycle that guar-
antee all agents a specified fraction of their maximin share value. While it is easy to show that
for any number of agents there are allocations guaranteeing each agent at least 1/2 their maximin
share, improving on the guarantee coefficient of 1/2 is a non-trivial problem. We show that it can
be improved to (
√
5 − 1)/2 (> 0.618). Further improvements are possible if we limit the number
of agents or the number of types of agents. In particular, we show that for the three-agent case,
there are allocations guaranteeing each agent 5/6 of their maximin share; for an arbitrary number
of agents of up to three types there are allocations guaranteeing each agent 3/4 of their maximin
share; and for any number of agents of t ≥ 4 types there are allocations guaranteeing each agent
t/(2t− 2) of their maximin share. In each case, these allocations can be found in polynomial time.
Moreover, the constants 5/6 and 3/4 for the cases of three agents and any number of agents of up to
three types, respectively, are best possible, that is, they cannot be replaced with any larger ones.
2. DEFINITIONS AND BASIC OBSERVATIONS
A utility function on a set V of goods (items) is a function assigning non-negative reals (utilities)
to goods in V . We extend utility functions to subsets of V by assuming additivity.
Following Bouveret et al. [2], we consider the case when goods form nodes of a certain con-
nected graph G = (V,E). We adopt the assumption of the connectedness of the graph for the
entire paper and do not mention it explicitly again. In particular, whenever we use the term graph
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we mean a connected graph. We write V (G) and E(G) for the sets of nodes and edges of G and
refer to G as the graph of goods. Given a graph G of goods, we will often refer to utility functions
on (the set) V (G) as utility functions on (the graph) G.
Let V = V (G) be a set of goods. A G-bundle is a subset of V that induces in G a connected
subgraph. A (G, n)-split is a sequence P1, . . . , Pn of pairwise disjoint G-bundles such that
n⋃
i=1
Pi = V.
We use the term split rather than partition as we allow bundles to be empty. When G or n are clear
from the context we drop them from the notation and speak about bundles and splits (occasionally,
G-splits and n-splits).
Let G be a graph of goods, u a utility function on G, q a non-negative real, and n a positive
integer. We call a split q-strong if every bundle in the split has value at least q under u. The
maximin share for G, u and n, written mms(n)(G, u), is defined by setting
mms
(n)(G, u) = max{q : there is a q-strong n-split of G}.
An equivalent definition is given by
mms
(n)(G, u) = max
P1,...,Pn
min
i=1,...,n
u(Pi),
where the maximum is taken over all n-splits P1, . . . , Pn of G. A split for which the maximum is
attained is a maximin share split or an mms-split for n and u or for n and an agent with a utility
function u. We often leave n and G implicit when they are clearly determined by the context.
By the definition, for every bundle P in an mms-split for n and u, u(P ) ≥ mms(n)(G, u). Sim-
ilarly as above, when G and n are clear from the context, we leave them out and write mms(u)
for mms(n)(G, u). When considering an agent i with a utility function ui we write mms(i) for
mms(ui).
Let G be a graph of goods. A (G, n)-allocation is an assignment of pairwise disjoint G-bundles
of goods to n agents 1, 2, . . . , n so that all goods are assigned. Clearly, (G, n)-allocations can
be represented by (G, n)-splits, where we understand that the ith bundle in the split is the bundle
assigned to agent i. Let ui be the utility function of agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A (G, n)-allocation
P1, . . . , Pn is a maximin share allocation, or an mms-allocation, if for every i = 1, . . . , n we have
ui(Pi) ≥ mms(n)(G, ui).
To illustrate the concepts introduced above, let us consider the graph in Figure 1. We will call
this graph G. The graph G defines the set of goods {v1, . . . , v8} and their adjacency structure. The
table in the figure shows three utility functions u1, u2 and u3 on the set of goods. The values of
the utility function u1 are also shown by the corresponding goods in the graph (it will facilitate our
discussion below).
In our example, the set {v1, v2, v6, v7} of goods is aG-bundle (or, simply a bundle, asG is clear).
Indeed, the subgraph of G induced by {v1, v2, v6, v7} is connected. On the other hand, the set
{v1, v2, v5, v6} of goods is not a bundle as the corresponding induced graph is not connected. Fur-
ther, the sequence {v1, v7, v8}, {v2, v3}, {v4, v5, v6} is a (G, 3)-split (or simply a 3-split). Indeed, all
sets in the split are bundles. It is also easy to see that the sequence {v1, v7, v8}, {v2, v4}, {v3, v5, v6}
is not a split as the set {v2, v4} is not a bundle.
Let us now consider the utility function u1. The total utility of all goods under u1 is 18. Further, it
is easy to see that 3-splits into bundles of value 6 (under u1) do not exist. To this end, we note that v1
and v8 cannot be in the same bundle valued at 6 as their total value is 7. Thus, the bundle containing
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v1 v2 v3 v4
v8 v7 v6 v5
3 1 1 4
4 1 1 3
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
u1 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4
u2 2 2 0 3 1 3 1 3
u3 1 3 2 3 0 3 2 3
FIGURE 1. A graph of goods and three utility functions.
v8 must be either {v6, v7, v8} or {v2, v7, v8}. In each case the value of the bundle containing v1 is
not 6. Thus,mms(3)(G, u1) < 6. On the other hand, the sequence {v1, v2, v3}, {v4, v5}, {v6, v7, v8}
is a 3-split with its bundles having values 5, 7 and 6, respectively. Thus, mms(3)(G, u1) = 5.
Reasoning in a similar way one can show that maximin share values for the two other utility
functions are also 5, that is, mms(3)(G, u2) = mms
(3)(G, u3) = 5. Let us now observe that
the sequence {v1, v7, v8}, {v4, v5, v6}, {v2, v3} is a 3-split (indeed, its components are bundles).
Moreover, u1({v1, v7, v8}) = 8, u2({v4, v5, v6}) = 7 and u3({v2, v3}) = 5. Thus, this 3-split
defines an mms-allocation of goods on G to three agents with the utility functions u1, u2 and u3.
Later, we will also see examples when mms-allocations of goods on graphs (specifically, cycles)
do not exist.
We now are ready to present a few basic results on the problem of the existence of mms-
allocations. Two agents are of the same type if they have the same utility functions. The maximin
share allocation problem is easy when all but one agent are of the same type.
Proposition 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph of goods. If we have n agents and at most one of them
is of a different type than the others, then an mms-allocation exists.
Proof. The result is obvious for n = 1. Thus, we will assume n ≥ 2. Let u be the utility function
of agents 1, . . . , n − 1 and u′ a utility function of n. Let Π be an mms-split for u, and P a bundle
of Π most valuable under u′. Then, u′(P ) ≥
∑
v∈V
u′(v)
n
≥ mms(u′). Assign P to agent n. Next,
allocate the remaining parts of Π to agents 1, . . . , n− 1 in an arbitrary way. Since for each bundle
Q in Π, u(Q) ≥ mms(u), the resulting allocation is an mms-allocation. 
In particular, this result applies to the case of two agents.
Corollary 2.2. Mms-allocations of goods on a graph to two agents always exist. ✷
Let G = (V,E) be a graph of goods. An agent with a utility function u on G (a utility function
u on G) is n-proportional if
mms(n)(G, u) =
∑
v∈V u(v)
n
.
We often omit n from the notation if it is clear from the context. A set {1, . . . , n} of agents (a
set {u1, . . . , un} of utility functions) is proportional if every agent i (utility function ui) is n-
proportional.
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An agent (a utility function) is n-regular if it is n-proportional and its maximin share (with
respect to n) is 1. A collection of n agents (utility functions) is regular if every agent in the
collection is n-regular. It is clear that for every agent in an n-element regular collection of agents,
the total value of all goods for that agent is n.
Let c be a positive real. A bundle P ⊆ V is c-sufficient for an agent i if ui(P ) ≥ c ·mms(i). An
allocation Π = P1, . . . , Pn is c-sufficient if for every i = 1, . . . , n, Pi is c-sufficient for i. Clearly, a
1-sufficient allocation is an mms-allocation. The next result shows that when studying the existence
of c-sufficient allocations (and so, in particular, mms-allocations) one can restrict considerations to
the case when all agents are regular. We use it to prove Theorem 2.4 later on in this section but its
full power becomes clear in Section 4.
Proposition 2.3. Let G be a graph of goods and c a positive real such that for every regular
collection of n agents (for every regular collection of n agents of at most t-types) a c-sufficient
allocation exists. Then a c-sufficient allocation exists for every collection of arbitrary n agents (for
every collection of arbitrary n agents of at most t types).
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents and {u1, . . . , un} the set of their utilities. If for
every i ∈ N , mms(n)(ui) = 0, then the assertion holds. Any split of G into n bundles is a c-
sufficient allocation.
Thus, let us assume that for at least one agent, say k, mms(n)(uk) > 0. For each agent i ∈ N
such that mms(n)(ui) = 0, we change her utility function to uk. We denote the new set of utilities
by v′′1 , . . . , v
′′
n. It is clear that if P1, . . . , Pn is a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the utility
functions v′′i , then it is also a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the original utilities ui. It is then
enough to prove that a c-sufficient allocation with respect to the functions v′′i exists.
For every agent i ∈ N , we denote by Πi any mms-split into n bundles with respect to the utility
function v′′i . For each bundle of Πi valued more than mms
(n)(v′′i ) we decrease the value of some
elements in that bundle to bring its value down to mms(n)(v′′i ). In this way, we produce a new
utility function, say v′i. Since for every item x, v
′
i(x) ≤ v′′i (x), mms(n)(v′i) ≤ mms(n)(v′′i ). On the
other hand, by the construction, for every bundle P ∈ Πi, v′i(P ) = mms(n)(v′′i ). Thus, each utility
function v′i is n-proportional and mms
(n)(v′i) = mms
(n)(v′′i ) > 0.
Next, for each agent i ∈ N we set ki = n/(
∑
y∈V (G) v
′
i(y)) and, for every x ∈ V (G), we define
vi(x) = kiv
′
i(x),
Clearly, each utility function vi, i ∈ N , is n-regular. Moreover, it follows directly from the con-
struction that if the original utility functions are of at most t types, then the resulting utility functions
are of at most t types, too.
Let Π = P1, . . . , Pn be a c-sufficient allocation for v1, . . . , vn (its existence is guaranteed by the
assumption). Therefore, for every agent i ∈ N , vi(Pi) ≥ c · mms(n)(vi). Since mms(n)(vi) =
kimms
(n)(v′i) and vi(Pi) = kiv
′
i(Pi), it follows that v
′
i(Pi) ≥ c · mms(n)(v′i). Next, we recall that
for every x ∈ V (G), v′′i (x) ≥ v′i(x). Consequently, for every bundle P , v′′i (P ) ≥ v′i(P ). Since for
every i ∈ N , mms(n)(v′i) = mms(n)(v′′i ), it follows that
v′′i (Pi) ≥ v′i(Pi) ≥ c ·mms(n)(v′i) = c ·mms(n)(v′′i ).
Thus, Π is a c-sufficient allocation of goods to agents in N with respect to the utility functions v′′i
and the result follows. 
Corollary 2.2 states that for two agents and for any connected graph of goods an mms-allocation
exists. On the other hand, Bouveret et al. [2] gave an example of nonexistence of an mms-allocation
6 ZBIGNIEW LONC AND MIROSLAW TRUSZCZYNSKI
for a cycle and four agents. In fact, as we show in Figure 2, even for three agents it may be that
mms-allocations of goods on a cycle do not exist. In that figure, v1, . . . , v9 denote consecutive
nodes of a cycle and the numbers in each row represent the utility functions. Observe that the
maximin shares for the agents 1 and 2 are 5. For the agent 3, it is 6. Moreover, no two consecutive
nodes have the total value satisfying any of the agents. Therefore, if an mms-allocation existed, it
would have to be a split into three bundles of three consecutive nodes each. It is simple to check
that none of the three possible partitions of this type is an mms-allocation.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9
agent 1 0 3 1 3 1 3 0 2 2
agent 2 2 2 0 3 1 3 1 3 0
agent 3 1 3 2 3 0 3 2 3 1
FIGURE 2. An example of nonexistence of an mms-allocation for a cycle with 9
nodes and 3 agents.
On the other hand, for three agents and at most 8 goods on a cycle mms-allocations always exist.
Theorem 2.4. For three agents and at most 8 goods on a cycle, mms-allocations always exist.
Proof. Let C be a cycle with at most 8 nodes and let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents. By
Proposition 2.3, we assume without loss of generality that the agents are 3-regular. In particular,
they are proportional andmms(i) = 1, for every i ∈ N .
Let us consider mms-splits for agents 1, 2 and 3, each into three bundles. By regularity, all
bundles in those splits are non-empty. Thus, each split determines three edges that connect adjacent
bundles of the split. Since C has 8 edges and there are three splits, there is an edge in C that
connects adjacent bundles in two different splits, say for agents 1 and 2. It follows that for some
bundles A and B of the mms-splits for agents 1 and 2, respectively, A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A.
Let us assume without loss of generality that A ⊆ B. Clearly, the elements of the set B −A can
be added to one of the two other parts of the mms-split for the agent 2 to form a 2-split of the path
C −A, say B′, B′′, with both parts of value at least 1 for the agent 2.
We now construct an mms-allocation as follows. If the set A has value at least 1 for the agent 3,
then she receives it. Clearly, the value of C −A for the agent 1 is equal to 2. Thus, one of the parts
B′, B′′ has value at least 1 to agent 1. We allocate this part to agent 1. Finally, the agent 2 receives
the part that remains.
If A does not satisfy the agent 3, then the agent 1 gets this part. The value of C−A for the agent
3, is larger than 2. Thus, we allocate the parts B′, B′′ to the agents 3 and 2 in the same way as to
the agents 1 and 2 in the previous case. 
We conclude this section with a comment on the notation. Formally, whenever we talk about
allocations of goods on a subgraph of a graph we consider, we should use restrictions of the utility
functions ui to the set of nodes of the subgraph. Continuing to refer to ui’s is simpler and does not
introduce ambiguity. Therefore, we adopt this convention in the paper.
3. COMPLEXITY AND ALGORITHMS
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of computational complexity and, in particular, with
the classes NP, ∆P2 and Σ
P
2 . We refer to the book by Papadimitriou [10] for details. We start with
general comments on how instances of fair division of indivisible goods on graphs are given. First,
we assume any standard representation of graphs. As our primary objective is to understand when
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problems we consider have polynomial solutions and not most efficient algorithms to solve them,
the details of how graphs are represented are not critical. Moreover, many of our results concern
particular graphs such as cycles, when explicit representations of nodes and edges are not even
needed. Finally, we assume that all utilities and other parameters that may be part of the input are
rational, the least restrictive assumption for studies of algorithms and complexity.
We now formally define several problems related to maximin share allocations of indivisible
goods on graphs and derive bounds on their complexity.
MMS-VALUES-G: Given a graph G on m goods, a utility function u, that is, a sequence u =
(u1, . . . , um) of non-negative rational numbers, an integer n > 1 and a rational number k ≥ 0,
decide whether mms(n)(G, u) ≥ k.
The problem was studied in the original case (with G being a complete graph) by Bouveret
and Lemaıˆtre [4]. Their complexity result and its proof extend to the general case. The hardness
argument uses a reduction from the well-known NP-complete problem PARTITION [7]:
PARTITION: Given a set U of m non-negative integers, decide whether there is a set X ⊆ U such
that
∑
u∈X u =
∑
u∈U\X u.
Proposition 3.1. The problem MMS-VALUES-G is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP. Indeed, to solve the problem, we guess an n-split and verify
that each of its parts induces in G a connected subgraph that has value at least k (under u). The
problem is NP-hard even in the case when G is a complete graph, n = 2 and the utility function
is integer valued. We can show this by a reduction from PARTITION. Indeed, an instance of
PARTITION consisting of a set of non-negative integers {u1, . . . , um} yields an instance to MMS-
VALUES-G with the complete graph of goods, n = 2, and k = ⌈(∑mi=1 ui)/2⌉. It is easy to
observe that an instance of PARTITION is a YES instance if and only if the corresponding instance
of MMS-VALUES-G is a YES instance. Thus, NP-hardness follows. 
Another related problem concerns the existence of an allocation meeting given bounds on the
values of its individual bundles.
ALLOC-G: Given a graph G on m goods, n utility functions u1, . . . , un (each ui is a sequence of
length m consisting of non-negative rational numbers) and n rational numbers q1, . . . , qn, decide
whether an allocation A1, . . . , An for G exists such that for every i = 1, . . . , n, ui(Ai) ≥ qi.
Proposition 3.2. The problem ALLOC-G is NP-complete.
Proof. The membership in NP is evident. The problem is NP-hard even if G is a complete graph,
n = 2, q1 = q2, and u1 = u2. Indeed, it becomes then the MMS-VALUES-G problem with G being
a complete graph, n = 2, k = q1 (= q2), and u = u1 (= u2). Thus, the proof of hardness for
Proposition 3.1 can be applied here, too. 
We use these observations to show an upper bound on the complexity of the problem of the
existence of an mms-allocation in the graph setting. We formally define the problem as follows.
MMS-ALLOC-G: Given a graph G of goods and n utility functions u1, . . . , un (each ui is a se-
quence of length m of non-negative rational numbers), decide whether an mms-allocation for G
and u1, . . . , un exists.
Theorem 3.3. The problem MMS-ALLOC-G is in the class∆P2 .
Proof. The key step in the proof is the observation that we can rescale each utility function so that
all its values are integers. To this end, given a utility function ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we compute the
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product, say ki, of all denominators of the rational numbers used by ui as its values. Next, we
multiply all values of ui by ki to produce a new utility function u
′
i. By the construction, all values
of u′i are indeed integers.
Let us denote by I the original input instance to the problem and by I ′ the instance obtained by
rescaling the utility functions in the way described above. We note that the products ki and the
rescaled utility functions u′i can be computed in timeO(nm
2M2), whereM is the number of digits
in the binary representation of the largest integer appearing as the numerator or the denominator
in rational numbers specifying the original utility functions ui. Since the size, say S, of the input
instance satisfies S = Ω(m+ n +M), I ′ can be computed in polynomial time in S.
Finally, we note that I is a YES instance of the problem MMS-ALLOC-G if and only if I ′ is a
YES instance of the problem. In fact, an allocation Π is an mms-allocation for I if and only if Π is
an mms-allocation for I ′.
Let us now consider an auxiliary problem where, given a graph G on m nodes and a sequence
s = s1, . . . , sm of m non-negative integers (that is, a utility function), the goal is to compute
mms
(n)(G, s). We will design for this problem an algorithm with an NP-oracle. We will then show
that our algorithm runs in polynomial time in the size of the representation of s, where we consider
each call to an oracle to be a single step taking a constant amount of time.
To this end, we observe thatmms(n)(G, s) ≤ (∑mj=1 sj)/n. Thus, we can computemms(n)(G, s)
by binary search on the range [0..⌊(∑mj=1 sj)/n⌋] of possible values for mms(n)(G, s). Each step
starts with a range, say [p..r], that contains mms(n)(G, s). We narrow down this range by making
a call to an oracle for the problem MMS-VALUES-G, which we proved to be NP-complete above.
The call to the oracle is made on the instance consisting of G, s and k = ⌈(p + r)/2⌉. Depending
on the oracle output, it results in a new smaller range — either [p..k − 1] or [k..r]. The process
stops when the range is reduced to just one element and that element is returned as mms(n)(G, s).
The number of range-narrowing steps is given by log2(⌊(
∑m
j=1 sj)/n⌋ + 1). Clearly,
log2(⌊(
m∑
j=1
sj)/n⌋+ 1) ≤ log2(
m∑
j=1
sj + 1) ≤
m∑
j=1
log2(sj + 1).
Since the number of bits needed to represent a non-negative integer x is given bymax(1, ⌈log2(x+
1)⌉, it follows that the size, say S ′, of the representation of a problem instance satisfies S ′ ≥∑m
j=1max(1, ⌈log2(sj + 1)⌉. Thus, the number of range-narrowing steps is bounded by S ′. Con-
sequently, the oracle algorithm we described runs indeed in polynomial time in S ′.
It follows that the problem MMS-ALLOC-G can be solved for an instance I by a procedure
consisting of these three steps:
(1) Compute the instance I ′.
(2) Compute the values qi = mms
(n)(G, u′i), where u
′
1, . . . , u
′
n are the rescaled utility functions
computed in step (1). This is done using the oracle algorithm described above. It can be
applied as all utilities in I ′ are integer-valued.
(3) Decide whether there is an allocation A1, . . . , Am for G such that u
′
i(Ai) ≥ qi, for every
i = 1, . . . , m, by invoking once an NP-oracle for the problem ALLOC-G.
We recall that I ′ can be computed in polynomial time in S (the size of the original instance I).
Based on that and on our discussion of the auxiliary problem, step (2) of our algorithm also runs
in polynomial time in S, counting each oracle call as taking a unit amount of time. Finally, the last
step takes a single call to an oracle. Thus, the entire algorithm runs in polynomial time in S, where
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we count each oracle call as taking the unit amount of time. Since the oracles used by the algorithm
are for NP-complete problems, the problem MMS-ALLOC-G is in∆P2 . 
The upper bound ∆P2 established by Theorem 3.3 applies also in the case when G is assumed
implicitly, for instance, when it is a path, a cycle or a complete graph represented by its set of nodes
(but not edges). It is because the number of oracle calls is bounded by the size of the representation
of the utility functions only. In the case of complete graphs, Theorem 3.3 yields an improvement
on the bound ΣP2 obtained by Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [4]. We do not know if the upper bound of
∆P2 can be improved in general and, in particular, whether it can be improved for complete graphs.
On the other hand, we do know that it can be improved for trees. Bouveret et al. [2] proved the
following two results.
Theorem 3.4 (Bouveret et al. [2]). There is a polynomial time algorithm that computesmms(n)(T, u)
and a corresponding mms-split given a tree of goods T , a non-negative rational utility function u
on the nodes (goods) of T , and an ingeter n ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.5 (Bouveret et al. [2]). For every tree T of goods and every set of n agents with non-
negative rational utility functions on the goods in T , an mms-allocation exists. Moreover, there is
a polynomial-time algorithm to find it.
The results we presented suggest a question of the relationship between the complexity of the
MMS-ALLOC-G problem and the properties of the underlying graph, as it becomes more complex
than trees. The first step towards understanding how the complexity grows is to analyze the case of
cycles and unicyclic graphs.
First, we show that as in the case of trees (cf. [2]), the maximin share values and mms-splits for
the case when goods form a cycle (or a unicyclic graph) can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.6. There is a polynomial time algorithm for computing mms(n)(U, u) and a corre-
sponding mms-split, where U is a unicyclic graph and u is a rational-valued utility function.
Proof. Using the rescaling technique discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can reduce in
polynomial time the general problem to the problem when all utilities are integers. To this end, we
compute the product, say k, of all denominators of the rational numbers that are values of goods
under u (if all values are integers, we assume the denominator is 1; this applies, in particular, to the
case when all utilities are 0). We then define a new utility function by multiplying the values of u
by k. Once the maximin share value for the rescaled utility function is computed, it is then used
as the numerator of the maximin share for u and k is used as the denominator. Thus, to complete
the proof it suffices to describe a method of computing mms(n)(U, u) and an mms-split under the
assumption that all values of u are integers.
Let C be the unique cycle of U . Every U-split has a bundle that contains C or is a split of the
graph U − e for some edge e ∈ C. Thus,
mms
(n)(U, u) = max(max
e∈C
mms
(n)(U − e, u),mmsC),
where mmsC stands for
max
P1,...,Pn
min
i=1,...,n
u(Pi),
with the maximum taken over all splits P1, . . . , Pn that have a bundle containing C. To compute
mmsC , we proceed as follows. We construct a tree UC by contracting C in U to a single “supern-
ode,” say c. Thus, the nodes of UC are all nodes of U − C and the supernode c. We define a utility
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function u′ on the nodes of UC by setting
u′(x) =
{
u(x) if x is a node of U − C (not the supernode)∑
y∈C u(y) if x = c (is a super node).
Clearly, mmsC = mms
(n)(UC , u
′). We note that UC and u
′ can be computed in polynomial time.
Moreover, UC and all graphs U − e, e ∈ C are trees. We now apply the algorithm by Bouveret et
al. [2] (cf. Theorem 3.4) to computemmsC and mms
(n)(U − e, u), for all edges e ∈ C, as well as
the corresponding mms-splits. This takes polynomial time. We then select the largest value among
them and return it together with its mms-split (in the case, the largest value ismmsC , in the bundle
containing the superode, we replace it with the nodes of C). 
It is now a matter of routine to show that the MMS-ALLOC-G problem for cycles and, more
generally, for unicyclic graphs is in NP.
Corollary 3.7. The problem MMS-ALLOC-G for unicyclic graphs is in NP.
Proof. Let U be a unicyclic graph and u1, . . . , un rational-valued utility functions defined on the
nodes of U . The following non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithm decides the problem
MMS-ALLOC-G: (1) guess an allocation P1, . . . , Pn, (2) compute the values mms
(n)(U, ui), i =
1, . . . , n, and (3) verify that ui(Pi) ≥ mms(n)(U, ui), i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 3.6, the step (2)
can be accomplished in polynomial time. Thus, the entire algorithm runs in polynomial time. 
We do not have an argument for NP-hardness of the problem MMS-ALLOC-G. Thus, we do not
know whether the bound obtained in Corollary 3.7 is tight in general. We do know, however, that
in some special cases it can be improved. We will now discuss these results.
Our first group of results is concerned with the case when the number m of goods is small with
respect to the number n of agents, specifically, when m ≤ 2n. Our results rely on the following
simple observation.
Proposition 3.8. Let C be a cycle, u a utility function on C, and n ≥ 2 an integer. For every node
x of C,mms(n−1)(C − x, u) ≥ mms(n)(C, u).
Proof. Let Π be an mms-split of C for u and n. Let P be the bundle in Π containing x, and let
P ′ and P ′′ be the two bundles in Π inducing in C segments neighboring the one induced by P ,
respectively preceding it and succeeding it when traversing C clockwise (P ′ = P ′′ if n = 2). We
move all goods in P that precede x to P ′ and those that succeed x to P ′′. In this way each bundle
still spans a connected segment in C. Next, we remove the “new” P (at this point, P consists of x
only). The result is a split Π′ of C − x into n− 1 bundles, in which every bundle has value at least
mms
(n)(C, u). Thus, mms(n−1)(C − x, u) ≥ mms(n)(C, u). 
We now are ready to show that, when there are m goods on a cycle and n agents, and m < 2n,
then mms-allocations are guaranteed to exist. Moreover, we also show that this result is sharp —
having exactlym = 2n goods allows for situations when mms-allocations do not exist.
Theorem 3.9. If m < 2n, then an mms-allocation ofm goods on a cycle C to n agents exists and
it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us consider agents 1, . . . , n with utility functions u1, . . . , un. Let Π be an mms-split for
the agent n. Clearly, for every bundle P ∈ Π, un(P ) ≥ mms(n)(C, un). Since m < 2n, at least
one bundle in Π consists of only one element, say x. It follows that un(x) ≥ mms(n)(C, un). Since
C − x is a path (and so, a tree), Theorem 3.5 implies that there is an allocation giving each agent j,
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1 ≤ j ≤ n−1, a bundle valued at leastmms(n−1)(C−x, uj). By Proposition 3.8, each such bundle
is valued at least mms(n)(C, uj). Thus, this allocation extended by the bundle {x}, allocated to the
agent n, forms an mms-allocation of the goods on C to n agents.
For an algorithm, we (1) compute the maximin share mms(n)(C, un); (2) select an item x such
that un(x) ≥ mms(n)(C, un) (as argued above, such an x exists); (3) construct an mms-allocation
of goods on the path C − x to agents 1, . . . , n− 1 (possible as C − x is a tree); and (4) extend the
allocation constructed in (3) by giving {x} to n.
By our argument above, the allocation constructed in step (4) is an mms-allocation. Steps (1)
and (3) can be accomplished in polynomial time by Theorems 3.6 and 3.5, respectively. The same
obviously holds for steps (2) and (4). Thus, the algorithm we described runs in polynomial time.

This result is sharp. If m = 2n and n > 3 then an mms-allocation of m goods on a cycle to n
agents may not exist as shown by the example in Figure 3.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 . . . v2n−1 v2n
agents 1, . . . , n− 2 n 1 n− 1 2 n− 2 3 . . . 1 n
agents n− 1, n n n 1 n− 1 2 n− 2 . . . n− 1 1
FIGURE 3. An example showing that the result in Theorem 3.9 is sharp.
Indeed, all maximin share values are n + 1. Thus, every bundle in any mms-allocation would
have to contain at least two elements. Sincem = 2n, every bundle would have to consist of exactly
two elements. There are only two splits of a cycle with m = 2n nodes into n bundles of two
consecutive goods. None of them is an mms-allocation. The assumption that n > 3 is essential.
We have seen earlier that if n = 2 then mms-allocations exist for every numberm of goods. Thus,
they exist form = 2n = 4. If n = 3, mms-allocations ofm goods on a cycle exist for everym ≤ 8
(cf. Theorem 2.4). In particular, they exist ifm = 2n = 6.
As our example shows, ifm = 2n, there are cases when mms-allocations do not exist. However,
whether an mms-allocation exists in the case whenm = 2n can be decided in polynomial time and,
if so, an mms-allocation can be computed efficiently.
Corollary 3.10. There is a polynomial time algorithm deciding the existence of an mms-allocation
of 2n goods on a cycle to n agents, and computing one, if one exists.
Proof. Let C be the cycle and u1, . . . , un the rational-valued utility functions of the agents 1, . . . , n.
We first compute the valuesmms(n)(C, ui), i = 1, . . . , n (cf. Theorem 3.6). If for some item x and
agent i, ui(x) ≥ mms(n)(C, ui), then reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.9 one can show that
an mms-allocation for C exists, and that it can be found in polynomial time. Otherwise, if there
is an mms-allocation of goods on C to n agents, every bundle in this allocation consists of two
consecutive goods. There are only two candidates for such allocations and one can check whether
any of them is an mms-allocation in polynomial time (as the valuesmms(n)(C, ui) are known). 
The next result of this section concerns the case of n agents of t types, where t is fixed and is not
a part of the input. Before we present our result and prove it, we discuss how inputs and outputs
are represented.
As we already noted earlier, instances to an mms-allocation problem on a cycle are specified by
a non-negative integer m representing the number of goods, and n m-element sequences of non-
negative rational numbers, each sequence representing a utility function. We note thatm implicitly
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defines the goods as v1, v2, . . . , vm, as well as the cycle as having these goods appear on it in this
order. Further, we adopt a natural convention that for every i = 1, . . . , m, the ith element in every
utility sequence provides the utility value for the good i. This representation consists of nm + 1
rational numbers (one of them,m, an integer).1
In the case when agents can be grouped into t types, where t is fixed and not part of input, the
case we are now considering, input instances can be represented more concisely by a non-negative
integerm, t sequences of m non-negative rational numbers (t utility functions) and t non-negative
integers s1, . . . , st, where each sr represents the number of agents of type r (that is, having ur as
their utility function). Thus, an instance consists of tm = Θ(m) rational numbers represented by
pairs of integers, and t + 1 = Θ(1) integers. We will use M to denote the length of the binary
representation of the largest of the integers appearing in this representation, and S to denote the
total size of the binary representations of the integers in the instance. In particular, we have that
S = Ω(m+M).
We observe that if n > m, then the maximin share for each agent is 0 and, consequently, every
allocation ofm goods to n agents is an mms-allocation. Since t is fixed, computing n = s1+. . .+st
takes time O(M) and, consequently, also O(S). Thus, this case can be recognized in time O(S)
and then handled directly. Namely, we return a sequence of t 0’s as the maximin shares for agents
of types 1, 2 . . . , t and, if an mms-allocation is required, we allocate all goods to agent 1 and
empty bundles of goods to all other agents. We do not generate any explicit representation for this
allocation. It is implicitly identified by the all-0’s output of the maximin shares. This is to avoid
having to output explicitly an n-element sequence of bundles, as n, the length of this sequence,
may be exponential in the size of input. It follows that the key case is then the case n ≤ m.
Theorem 3.11. For every integer t ≥ 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm deciding existence of
an mms-allocation ofm goods on a cycle to n agents of t types (and computing one, if one exists).
Proof. Let us consider an instance to the problem given by an integer m (the number of goods), t
sequences u1, . . . , ut, each consisting ofm non-negative rational numbers (t utility functions), and
t non-negative integers s1, . . . , st (the numbers of agents of type 1, . . . , t, respectively). We start
by computing n = s1 + s2 + . . . + st, which can be accomplished in O(S) time, as t is fixed (we
recall that we write S for the size of the input instance). The case n > m has been discussed above.
Thus, in what follows we assume that n ≤ m. An important consequence of this assumption is that
for every r = 1, . . . , t, sr ≤ m.
To decide whether there is an mms-allocation and, if so, to compute it, we compute the values
qr = mms
(n)(C, ur), r = 1, . . . , t. Since t is fixed, Theorem 3.6 implies that all these values can
be computed in time bounded by a polynomial in |u|, where |u| represents the largest size of the
representation of an input utility function and, consequently, also by a polynomial in S.
We now observe that an allocation Π of goods on C to agents of t types given by u1, . . . , ut is an
mms-allocation on C if and only if for some edge e of C, Π is an allocation of goods on the path
C − e to these agents such that for every agent of type r, the bundle P ∈ Π allocated to that agent
satisfies ur(P ) ≥ qr.
Thus, to prove the assertion, it is enough to show that the following problem has a polynomial-
time solution: Given a path F of m goods v1, v2, . . . , vm, appearing in this order on F , t rational-
valued utility functions u1, . . . , ut, t non-negative integers s1, . . . , st such that n = s1 + . . .+ st ≤
m, and t non-negative integers q1, . . . , qt, find an allocation Π of goods on F to s1+ . . .+ st agents
such that for every agent of type r, the bundle P assigned to that agent satisfies ur(P ) ≥ qr.
1We note that we do not include the number of agents, n, in the input; if we need it, we can compute it by counting
in the input the sequences representing the utility functions.
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To describe our method, we define H to be the set of all sequences (h1, . . . , ht) such that for
every r = 1, . . . , t, 0 ≤ hr ≤ sr. Clearly, the number of sequences in H is bounded by (s1 + 1) ·
. . . · (st+1) ≤ (m+1)t = O(mt) = O(St). IfH denotes a sequence (h1, . . . , ht) ∈ H and hr > 0,
where 1 ≤ r ≤ t, then we write H−r for the sequence (h1, . . . , hr−1, hr − 1, hr+1, . . . , ht) which,
we note, also belongs toH.
For a sequence (h1, . . . , ht) ∈ H, we define T (h1, . . . , ht) to be the smallest j such that there is
an allocation of goods v1, . . . , vj to h1 + . . . + ht agents, exactly hr of them of type r, 1 ≤ r ≤ t,
so that each agent of type r obtains a bundle worth at least qr. If such an allocation does not exist,
T (h1, . . . , ht) is set to∞.
Next, for every j = 1, . . . , m and every r = 1, . . . , t, we define k(j, r) to be the minimum k ≥ j
such that ur({vj+1, . . . , vk}) ≥ qr. We set k(j, r) = ∞ if such a k does not exist. Clearly, all
values k(j, r) can be computed in time O(tmM) = O(mM) = O(S2).
Let (h1, . . . , ht) ∈ H. We will show that T (h1, . . . , ht) can be efficiently computed. Clearly,
T (0, . . . , 0) = 0 (there are no agents to get any bundles and so, even the empty path suffices).
Thus, let us considerH = (h1, . . . , ht) ∈ H and let us assume that h1+ . . .+ht > 0. Let us define
I = {r : hr > 0, 1 ≤ r ≤ t}. It is easy to see that
(1) T (H) = min{k(T (H−r ), r) : r ∈ I}.
Assuming that all values k(T (H−r ), r), for r ∈ I , are known, T (H) can be computed in time
O(t) = O(1). It follows that with the initial value of T (0, . . . , 0) = 0, considering sequences H ∈
H in any order consistent with non-decreasing sums of their elements and using the formula (1)
to compute T (H), one can compute T (s1, . . . , sr) in polynomial time, in fact, in time O(S
max(2,t))
(we recall that all values k(j, r) can be computed in time O(S2); also, the number of entries in T
is O(St) and each entry can be computed in O(1) time).
If T (s1, . . . , st) =∞, then there is no split Π of F such that for every agent of type r, its bundle
P ∈ Π satisfies ur(P ) ≥ qr. Otherwise, T (s1, . . . , st) 6= ∞ and a split solving the problem exists.
Moreover, it can be computed in the standard way for dynamic programming algorithms. To this
end, each time the formula (1) is applied we have to record an index r ∈ I that minimizes the
expression k(T (H−r ), r)). This information allows us to construct the split in polynomial time in
S.
As all algorithmic tasks we presented can be accomplished in time bounded by a polynomial in
S, the assertion follows. 
We close this section with yet another corollary to Theorem 3.6. It concerns a possibility of
regularizing utility functions on unicyclic graphs in polynomial time by converting a method used
in the proof of Proposition 2.3 into an algorithm. Let us call a collection {u1, . . . , un} trivial if for
every i, mms(n)(ui) = 0. We will call all other collections non-trivial.
Corollary 3.12. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a unicyclic graph U of goods,
and a non-trivial collection of rational-valued utility functions ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, on U , produces a
rational-valued regular collection of utility functions u′i on U such that for every c, if a split Π is a
c-sufficient allocation with respect to u′i’s then it is a c-sufficient allocation with respect to ui’s. If
the original utility functions are of at most t types, then the resulting utility functions are of at most
t types.
Proof. The algorithm follows the method we used in the proof of Proposition 2.3. It consists of the
following key steps.
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(1) Rescale the utilities ui as described in the proof of Theorem 3.3 to produce an equivalent
collection of integer-valued utilities wi (by equivalent we mean determining the same splits
as mms-allocations).
(2) Compute the maximin shares qi = mms
(n)(U,wi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(3) Select one utility function wk such that qk > 0. For each agent i such that qi = 0, replace
wi with wk; denote the new utility functions vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(4) For a good x and a utility function vi, use the binary search method, similar to that used in
the proof of Theorem 3.3, to find the smallest a such thatmms(n)(U, vx→ai ) = qi; replace vi
with vx→ai ; repeat for all goods as long as it is possible to decrease a value of some utility
function on some good.2
(5) Rescale the computed utility functions so that the values of each of them sum up to n. Call
the resulting functions u′i.
The correctness of the method, both for the main statement and under the restriction to utility
functions of at most t types, follows from the argument used to prove Proposition 2.3. For the
running time, we note that step (1) runs in polynomial time (we argued this in the proof of Theorem
3.3). Step (2) runs in polynomial time (Theorem 3.6). Step (3) runs in time O(nm). Next, we note
that the argument we used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 to estimate the running time of the “range
narrowing” binary search and the fact that the maximin shares can be computed in polynomial time
(Theorem 3.6) together imply that step (4) runs in polynomial time. Step (5) consists of O(nm)
additions and multiplications involving utility values produced in step (4) and the integer n. Thus,
it also runs in polynomial time in the size of the original instance. 
4. APPROXIMATE MAXIMIN SHARE ALLOCATIONS ON A CYCLE
We start with a simple observation that 1
2
-sufficient allocations always exist and, moreover, can
be found in polynomial time.
Proposition 4.1. There is a polynomial time algorithm which, for any number of agents and any
number of goods on a cycle, constructs a 1
2
-sufficient allocation.
Proof. We remove any edge e from the cycle C and get a path, say P . The maximin share for each
agent on P is at least half of the original maximin share for C. Indeed, let us consider an arbitrary
agent i and her mms-split of C. By removing e, no more than one part of this split may break into
two pieces. The value for the agent i of one of these pieces is at least 1
2
mms(i). We adjoin the other
piece, if it is present, to its neighboring part in the mms-split of C. In this way, we obtain a split of
P . Clearly, in this split of P every piece is worth to i at least 1
2
mms(i), so the claim follows.
Thus, a 1
2
-sufficient allocation can be found by (1) removing any edge from the cycle, (2) apply-
ing to the resulting path the algorithm by Bouveret et al. [2] that constructs in polynomial time an
mms-allocation for trees (cf. Theorem 3.5). 
To find a better guarantee than 1
2
turns out to be non-trivial. We will show that it can be improved
to (
√
5 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.61803..., and that further improvements are possible if we restrict the number
of agent types.
Let c be a positive real and let N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, be a set of agents with arbitrary
utility functions u1, . . . , un on a set of goods on a path, say P . Figure 4 shows an algorithm allocate
that assigns to some (possibly all) agents in N bundles they value at c or more.
2Here, vx→a
i
stands for the utility function obtained from vi by setting its value on x to a and keeping all other
values as they are in vi.
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allocate(N,P,Q, c)
% P is a path; we fix its direction so that prefixes of P are well defined
% N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, is a set of agents, each with a utility function on P
% c is a positive real
% Q is a prefix of P valued at least c by at least one agent in N
1 S := {i ∈ N : there is an (n− 1)-split of P −Q that is c-strong for i};
2 R := N − S;
3 j := 1;
4 while j ≤ n and P has value at least c for some i ∈ S ∪ R do
5 Qj := the shortest prefix of P worth at least c for some agent i ∈ R ∪ S
6 if Qj is worth at least c to an agent i ∈ R then
7 assign Qj to i;
8 R := R − {i}
9 else
10 assign Qj to an agent i ∈ S such that Qj is worth at least c for i;
11 S := S − {i};
12 P := P −Qj ;
13 j := j + 1
FIGURE 4. Algorithm allocate
We will use this algorithm in our theoretical considerations on the existence of c-sufficient al-
locations. Under the restriction to rational-valued utilities and a rational c, the algorithm runs in
polynomial time. We will use it to argue the existence of polynomial-time algorithms for construct-
ing c-sufficient allocations.
First, let us discuss the algorithm allocate informally. The algorithm starts by defining a set S to
consist of all agents i in N for whom an (n− 1)-split of P −Q that is c-strong for i can be found.
The algorithm then sets R = N − S. We note that N = S ∪ R, S ∩ R = ∅ and that it may be that
one of the sets S and R is empty.
Next, the algorithm sets j to 1 and proceeds to the loop (4–13). Each time the body of the loop
is executed, it assigns a bundle to an “unassigned” agent. Throughout the execution of the loop,
P denotes the path consisting of unallocated goods, and R ∪ S contains all agents that are as yet
unassigned. In each iteration j, the algorithm attempts to allocate a bundle to an “unassigned”
agent. At the start of that iteration j − 1 agents have received bundles selected as prefixes of the
paths being considered in earlier iterations. If j > n, then the loop terminates and all agents are
assigned bundles. If j ≤ n, some agents are unassigned,R∪S contains all unassigned agents and P
is a path on unallocated goods. If the value of P for each unassigned agent is less than c, no further
assignments are possible and the loop terminates. Otherwise P has value at least c for at least one
unassigned agent and an assignment can be made. The bundle for the assignment, denoted by Qj
is chosen as a shortest prefix of P that has value at least c for some unassigned agent. Selecting Qj
as a prefix ensures that the remaining goods form a path. Selecting for Qj a shortest prefix that has
value c or more for some unassigned agent is essential for a key property of the algorithm, which
we will discuss later. Once the bundle Qj is constructed, it is assigned. By construction, there are
unassigned agents that value Qj at c or more. We select one such agent, say i. We first check if
such an agent i can be found in R and if so, assign Qj to i. Only if no agent in R values Qj at c or
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more, we select i from S (this selection is possible as at least one unassigned agent values Qj at c
or more), and assign Qj to that i.
The following proposition gives the key property of the algorithm allocate.
Proposition 4.2. Let P be a path of goods andN = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, a set of agents, each
with a utility function on P , and c a positive real. Further, let Q be a prefix of P valued at least
c by at least one agent in N , and S the set computed by the algorithm allocate(N,P,Q, c) in line
(1). When the algorithm allocate(N,P,Q, c) terminates, S = ∅, that is, all agents included in S in
line (1) are assigned bundles they value at c or more.
Proof. We will denote by P0 the original path P and by S0 the set S as computed in line (1). Let
us assume that when the algorithm allocate(N,P0, Q, c) terminates, S 6= ∅. Let i ∈ S. Since after
line (1) the algorithm never includes elements in S, it follows that i ∈ S0.
Let us consider the value, say jt of the variable j when the loop (4–13) terminates. Clearly, the
body of the loop was executed jt−1 times and jt−1 agents are assigned bundlesQ1, . . . , Qjt−1. By
the conditions on the input parameters, the body of the loop executes for j = 1 and defines a bundle
Q1. This bundle is a prefix of Q (because of how we select prefixes Qj). Since i ∈ S0, P0 −Q has
an (n − 1)-split that is c-strong for i. Since Q1 is a prefix of Q, P0 − Q1 has an (n − 1)-split that
is c-strong for i. Let us denote this split by D2, . . . , Dn. Since i has not been assigned a bundle in
iteration 1 (in any iteration, in fact) and D2 has value at least c for i, at the beginning of iteration
2 we have that i ∈ S ∪ R and the value of the path P for i is at least c. Thus, the body of the
loop executes for the second time. It follows that 3 ≤ jt. Further, since i is not assigned a bundle,
jt − 1 ≤ n− 1. Thus, 3 ≤ jt ≤ n.
Let us assume that (Q1 ∪ . . .∪Qjt−1)∩Djt = ∅. It follows that in the iteration of the loop when
j = jt, Djt ⊆ P . Thus, P has value at least c for i. Consequently, the body of the loop would
execute for j = jt, a contradiction. Therefore, we have (Q1 ∪ . . . ∪Qjt−1) ∩Djt 6= ∅.
Let k be the smallest integer such that 3 ≤ k ≤ jt and (Q1 ∪ . . . ∪ Qk−1) ∩ Dk 6= ∅. From our
observation above it follows that k is well defined. Moreover, (Q1 ∪ . . . ∪Qk−2) ∩Dk−1 = ∅. Let
P be the path of unallocated goods when j = k−1, that is, P = P0− (Q1∪ . . .∪Qk−2). It follows
thatDk−1 is a subpath of P . LetD be the shortest prefix of P containingDk−1. It follows thatD is
a strictly shorter prefix of P than Qk−1 and D has value at least c to i. This is a contradiction with
the algorithm selecting Qk−1 when j = k − 1. 
Extending the notation we used for splits, we call an allocation q-strong if it assigns to each
agent a bundle worth at least q to that agent. We note that for regular sets of agents, q-strong and
q-sufficient allocations coincide.
Theorem 4.3. Let P be a path of goods, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, a regular set of agents, and c a
real such that c ≤ 1. Further, let Q be a prefix of P valued at least c by at least one agent in N .
Let R be the set computed by the algorithm allocate(N,P,Q, c) in line (2). If no single good in P
has value at least c for any agent inN and |R| ≤ 1−c
c
n+1, then the algorithm allocate(N,P,Q, c)
finds a c-strong allocation of goods in P to agents in N .
Proof. Let us assume that when the algorithm terminates, some agents are left without a bundle. Let
us denote s = |S|, r = |R|, where S and R are computed in the lines (1) and (2) of the algorithm
allocate(N,P,Q, c) and let k be the number of agents that have no bundle when the algorithm
terminates. By Proposition 4.2, these agents are members of R. Moreover, by our assumption,
k ≥ 1.
Let ℓ be an unassigned agent. Clearly, in each iteration that assigns a bundle to an agent from
S, the value of that bundle is smaller than c for the agent ℓ (it is so because agents in R have a
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preference over agents in S when bundles are assigned). Moreover, in each iteration j when an
agent from R is assigned a bundle, we recall this bundle is referred to as Qj , the value ofQj for the
agent ℓ is smaller than 2c. Indeed, otherwise the prefix of Qj formed by removing the last node of
Qj would have value at least c for ℓ (since, by assumption, that node is worth less than c to ℓ). This
contradicts the property that Qj is a shortest prefix of the path P in the iteration j.
It follows that the total value for ℓ of all bundles constructed and allocated by the algorithm is
less than cs+2c(r− k). Consequently, the value for ℓ of all unallocated goods when the algorithm
terminates, say vℓ, satisfies vℓ > n − cs − 2c(r − k) (since N is a regular collection of agents,
for every agent in N , the total value of goods on P to that agent is n). On the other hand, by the
stopping condition, vℓ < c. Thus, c > n − cs − 2c(r − k). Since s = n − r, it follows that
r > 1−c
c
n+ 2k − 1 ≥ 1−c
c
n + 1, a contradiction.
Thus, when the algorithm terminates, all agents are assigned bundles and each bundle the algo-
rithm allocates to an agent has value at least c for that agent. In other words, the allocation defined
by the algorithm is c-strong. 
Theorem 4.4. Let C be a cycle of goods and N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2, a set of agents, each
with a utility function on C. Let
c = max
d=n,n+1,...
min
(
n
d
,
n⌈
n2
d
⌉
+ n− 2
)
Then, there is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N .
Proof. By Proposition 2.3, it suffices to show the result under the assumption that N is a regular
collection of agents. In particular, c-sufficient allocations and c-strong allocations coincide.
If some node x of C has value at least c to some agent j then a c-sufficient allocation exists.
Indeed, we assign x to the agent j. By Proposition 3.8, the values of the maximin shares for the
remaining n − 1 agents and the path C − x do not drop. Applying the algorithm of Bouveret at
al. [2], we construct an mms-allocation of goods on the path C − x to those n − 1 agents. This
allocation together with an assignment of x to the agent j is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on
C to agents in N (j receives a bundle worth at least at c and all other agents receive bundles worth
at least their maximin share). So, we assume that no single-element bundle is c-sufficient for any
agent in N .
For every agent i ∈ N we select any of her mms-splits of C. By regularity, all bundles in these
splits are non-empty. Thus, each selected split can be obtained by removing n different edges, say
ei1, . . . , e
i
n, from C. We arrange all edges e
i
j , i, j = 1, . . . , n, into a sequence E = e0, e1, . . . , en2−1.
To this end, we start in any place in C and inspect the edges of C moving clockwise. Each time
we find an edge e used to obtain mms-splits for, say, k agents, we place k occurrences of e in the
sequence.
For an integer d = n, n+ 1, . . ., we define
f(d) = min
(
n
d
,
n⌈
n2
d
⌉
+ n− 2
)
.
We then define p to be that integer d ≥ n, for which f(d) achieves its maximum (in case of ties
we pick for p the smallest of those values d). Since f(n) > 1/2 and, for d ≥ n2, f(d) ≤ 1/n, it
follows that n ≤ p < n2. It is also clear that f(p) = c (as defined in the statement of the theorem).
Moreover, c ≤ n
⌈n2/p⌉+n−2
≤ 1.
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Let us define h =
⌈
n2
p
⌉
, h =
⌊
n2
p
⌋
and r = n2 − p · h. Clearly, we have h ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ r < p.
We define a split of the cycle C into p parts (some of them possibly empty) by removing p edges
ei, where i = 0, h, 2h, . . . , rh, rh + h, rh + 2h, . . . , rh + (p − r − 1)h. It is easy to check that
between two consecutive removed edges there are h− 1 or h− 1 edges of the sequence E.
Let Q be a part of this split with the largest value to agent n (any other agent could be chosen for
n, too). This value is at least n
p
≥ f(p) = c. Let P be the path obtained from C by removing an
edge so that Q is a prefix of P . We will show that the call allocate(N,P,Q, c) produces a c-strong
allocation for N .
First, we note that Q contains at most h− 1 edges of the sequence E. This means that there are
at most h − 1 agents such that Q intersects more than one part of their mms-split. For each of the
remaining agents their mms-split gives rise to an (n − 1)-split of the path P − Q that is 1-strong
for them. Since c ≤ 1, these splits are c-strong for the corresponding agents and, consequently,
all these agents are in S — the set defined in line (1) of the algorithm allocate(N,P,Q, c). It
follows that |S| ≥ n− (h− 1). Let R be the set defined in line (2) of allocate(N,P,Q, c). Clearly,
|R| = n− |S| ≤ h− 1. Hence, by the definition of p,
|R| ≤ h− 1 =
⌈
n2
p
⌉
− 1 ≤ n
f(p)
− n+ 1 = n
c
− n + 1 = 1− c
c
n + 1.
By Theorem 4.3, there is a c-strong allocation for P . This allocation is also a c-strong allocation
for C. 
This result yields a corollary that displays a specific value c for which the existence of c-sufficient
allocations of goods on cycles is guaranteed. Let
ϕ =
√
5 + 1
2
and ψ =
1
ϕ
=
√
5− 1
2
≈ 0.61803.. .
Corollary 4.5. For any number n of agents there is a ψ-sufficient allocation for a cycle.
Proof. Clearly, the corollary holds for n = 1, so we assume that n ≥ 2. Since ⌊ϕn⌋ ≥ n, by
Theorem 4.4, it suffices to show that
min
(
n
d
,
n⌈
n2
d
⌉
+ n− 2
)
≥ ψ,
where d = ⌊ϕn⌋.
Clearly, n
⌊ϕn⌋
≥ n
ϕn
= ψ. Thus, it remains to prove that
ψ ≤ n⌈
n2
⌊nϕ⌋
⌉
+ n− 2
.
To this end, we observe that n2 ≤ n2 + n− 1 = (ϕn− 1)(ψn+ 1), so
ψ ·
(⌈
n2
⌊ϕn⌋
⌉
+ n− 2
)
≤ ψ ·
(⌈
(ϕn− 1)(ψn+ 1)
ϕn− 1
⌉
+ n− 2
)
≤ ψ · (ψn+ 2 + n− 2) = ψ(ψ + 1)n = n.

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We now turn our attention to the problem of c-sufficient allocations when some agents have the
same utility function, that is, are of the same type. Specifically, we will consider allocations of
goods on cycles to n agents of at most t types.
Lemma 4.6. Let C be a cycle of goods, N a regular set of agents, t ≥ 2 an integer, and Ni,
1 ≤ i ≤ t, pairwise disjoint subsets of N such that ⋃ti=1Ni = N , |N1| ≥ |N2| ≥ . . . ≥ |Nt| and,
for every i = 1, . . . , t, all agents in Ni are of the same type. If N1, N2 6= ∅ and there are splits
Π1 and Π2 such that Πi is
t
2t−2
-strong for agents in Ni, for i = 1, 2, and there is a bundle in Π1
and a bundle in Π2 whose intersection has value at least
t
2t−2
to some agent in N , then there is a
t
2t−2
-strong allocation of goods on C to agents in N .
Proof. Let us define n = |N |, ct = t2t−2 , and ni = |Ni|, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We will call agents in a set Ni,
1 ≤ i ≤ t, to be of type i.
If there is a single good, say x, in C of value at least ct to some agent k ∈ N , then agent k
receives x. It follows from Theorem 3.5 that there is an mms-allocation for the path C − x and
the remaining n − 1 agents. We distribute the goods of C − x to these n − 1 agents according
to this allocation. By Proposition 3.8, each agent i ∈ N \ {k} receives a bundle worth to her at
least mms(n)(i). Since each agent is regular, for every i ∈ N we have mms(n)(i) = 1 ≥ ct. Thus,
each agent in N is allocated a bundle worth at least ct to her. In other words, the allocation we
constructed is ct-strong.
Thus, let us assume that no single good in C has value at least ct for any agent in N . Let Q be
the intersection of two bundles A and B, where A is a bundle from Π1 and B is a bundle from Π2,
such thatQ has value at least ct for some agent inN . It is clear thatQ is a proper subpath of C. Let
P be the path obtained from C by removing an edge so that Q is a prefix of P . We will consider
the call allocate(N,P,Q, ct) and follow the notation introduced in the description of the algorithm.
Since Q ⊆ A,B, all agents of types 1 and 2 are in S. It follows that |R| ≤ n− (n1 + n2). Since
n1 ≥ n2 ≥ . . . ≥ nt, n1 + n2 ≥ 2nj , for j = 3, . . . , t. Thus,
(t− 2)(n1 + n2) ≥ 2(n3 + . . .+ nt) = 2(n− (n1 + n2)).
Consequently, we have n1 + n2 ≥ 2tn. We use this inequality to estimate |R| getting
|R| ≤ n− 2
t
n =
t− 2
t
n =
1− ct
ct
n.
By Theorem 4.3, there is a ct-strong allocation of goods on C to agents in N . 
We will use this lemma to obtain a general result about the existence of c-sufficient allocations
for any number of agents of t ≥ 4 types. Afterwards, we will obtain results for the two specific
cases of t = 2 and t = 3.
Theorem 4.7. Let C be a cycle of goods, N a set of agents of at most t types, where t ≥ 4. Then,
a t
2t−2
-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 we may assume that all agents in N are regular. Thus, we have that the
maximin share for all agents is 1.
Let n1, . . . , nt be the numbers of agents of types 1, . . . , t, respectively, and let n = n1+. . .+nt be
the number of all agents inN . As before, we define ct =
t
2t−2
and assume that n1 ≥ n2 ≥ . . . ≥ nt.
If all agents are of the same type, Proposition 2.1 ensures the existence of an mms-allocation. Since
ct < 1, this mms-allocation is also a
t
2t−2
-sufficient allocation. Thus, we assume that n2 > 0 (and
so, obviously, n1 > 0, as well).
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LetA1, . . . , An andB1, . . . , Bn be mms-splits of the cycle for agents of type 1 and 2, respectively.
In particular, since ct < 1, the two splits are ct-strong for agents of type 1 and 2, respectively.
If for some i and j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the path Ai ∩ Bj has value at least ct to some agent in
N , then we are done by Lemma 4.6. Indeed, by the regularity of the set of agents, ct-strong and
ct-sufficient allocations coincide.
So, let us assume that no path Ai ∩ Bj has value ct or more to any agent. Then, in particular,
Ai 6⊆ Bj and Bj 6⊆ Ai for all i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Thus, each of the sets A1, . . . , An intersects
exactly two consecutive sets of the mms-splitB1, . . . , Bn. We can assume without loss of generality
that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set Ai intersects the sets Bi and Bi+1 (the arithmetic on indices is
modulo n, adjusted to the range [1..n]).
We claim that the mms-split A1, . . . , An for agents of type 1 is a ct-sufficient split for agents
of type 2. To prove it denote by u2 the utility function for agents of type 2. Since for every i,
1 ≤ i ≤ t, Ai ⊆ Bi ∪Bi+1, it follows that
2 = u2(Bi ∪ Bi+1) = u2(Ai−1 ∩ Bi) + u2(Ai) + u2(Ai+1 ∩Bi+1).
By our assumption the sets Ai−1 ∩ Bi and Ai+1 ∩ Bi+1 have value less than ct to any agent. Since
for t ≥ 4 we have ct ≤ 23 , it follows that u2(Ai) > 2 − 2ct ≥ ct. We proved that A1, . . . , An is
a ct-strong split for any agent of type 2. As we noted, it is also a ct-strong split for agents of type
1. Therefore, we can take A1, . . . , An for Π1 and Π2 in Lemma 4.6. Moreover, A1 is clearly the
intersection of a bundle in Π1 with a bundle in Π2 simply because A1 is a bundle in each of these
splits. Moreover, as A1, . . . , An is an mms-split for agents of type 1, A1 has value at least 1 and,
consequently, at least ct for agents of type 1. Thus, the assumptions of Lemma 4.6 are satisfied
and a ct-strong allocation exists. This completes the proof as ct-strong and ct-sufficient allocations
coincide. 
Next, we consider the case of agents of two types and show that 3
4
-sufficient allocations of goods
on a cycle to n agents of two types are always possible. Later on we will present a result showing
that 3
4
-sufficient allocations of goods on a cycle also exist when agents are of three types. The proof
of this more general result is highly technical, complex and long (enough so that we provide it in an
appendix). In contrast, the proof in the case of agents of two types is simple yet still of substantial
interest in its own right to be presented.
Theorem 4.8. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of no more than two types. Then, a
3
4
-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 we may assume that the set N of agents is regular. In particular, 3
4
-
strong and 3
4
-sufficient allocations coincide. Let n be the number of agents and let n1 and n2 be
the numbers of agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. Clearly, n = n1 + n2. We will write u1
and u2 for the utility functions for the agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we will assume that n1 ≥ n2. If n2 = 0, then all agents are of the same type and an
mms-allocation (or, equivalently, a 1-sufficient allocation) exists by Proposition 2.1. This implies
the assertion. Therefore, we will assume that n2 > 0. Consequently, n1 > 0, too.
Let A1, . . . , An and B1, . . . , Bn be mms-splits for agents of type 1 and type 2, respectively. If
some set Ai ∩Bj , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is of value at least 34 to some agent, then we allocate this set
Ai ∩ Bj to this agent. Let P = C − (Ai ∩ Bj). Clearly, P is a path. Moreover, since every bundle
in the split A1, . . . , An other than Ai is included in P , mms
(n−1)(P, u1) ≥ mms(n)(C, u1) = 1.
Similarly, we have mms(n−1)(P, u2) ≥ 1. Thus, we can assign the goods in P to the remaining
n− 1 agents so that each agent receives a bundle that she values at least at 1. To this end, we may
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use the algorithm by Bouveret et al.[2] (cf. Theorem 3.5). The resulting allocation of goods on C
is 3
4
-strong and so, 3
4
-sufficient.
Therefore, we assume from now on that no set Ai ∩ Bj , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is of value 34 or more for
any of the agents. In particular, Ai 6⊆ Bj and Bj 6⊆ Ai for all i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Thus, without
loss of generality, we can assume that each set Ai has a nonempty intersection with the sets Bi and
Bi+1 (addition modulo n adjusted for [1..n]) and with no other set Bj .
We will show that the sets A1, . . . , An can be allocated so that each agent receives a set of value
at least 3
4
to this agent. Suppose that fewer than n
2
of the sets A1, . . . , An have value at least
3
4
to
agents of type 2. Then, there are two sets Ai, Ai+1 such that each of them is valued at less than
3
4
by agents of type 2. Thus, we have
3 = u2(Bi ∪Bi+1 ∪Bi+2)
= u2(Ai−1 ∩Bi) + u2(Ai ∪ Ai+1) + u2(Ai+2 ∩Bi+2)
<
3
2
+ u2(Ai−1 ∩Bi) + u2(Ai+2 ∩ Bi+2).
This inequality implies that at least one of the sets Ai−1 ∩Bi and Ai+2 ∩Bi+2 has value larger that
3
4
for agents of type 2, a contradiction.
It follows that at least n
2
of the sets A1, . . . , An are of value at least
3
4
to agents of type 2. Since
there are at most n
2
agents of this type (we recall that n1 ≥ n2), we have sufficiently many such sets
for them. The remaining sets are allocated to agents of type 1. The resulting allocation is 3
4
-strong
and so, also 3
4
-sufficient. 
Theorem 4.8 is tight. Let us consider a cycle v1, v2, . . . , v12, and six agents of two types with the
utility functions shown in Figure 5. It is easy to check that in this case 3
4
-sufficient allocation exists
but c-sufficient allocation for c > 3
4
does not.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12
agents 1, 2, 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 1
agents 4, 5, 6 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 1 3
FIGURE 5. An example showing that the result in Theorem 4.8 is sharp.
As we pointed out above, the 3
4
fraction of maximin shares can be guaranteed in a more general
setting when agents are of three types. Specifically, the following theorem holds. We provide its
proof in the appendix.
Theorem 4.9. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of at most three types. Then, a
3
4
-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
Theorem 4.9 is tight too. In Figure 6 we present an example where a 3
4
-sufficient allocation of
goods on a cycle exists but there is no c-sufficient allocation for any c > 3
4
.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 v17 v18
agents 1, 2 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1
agents 3, 4 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0
agents 5, 6 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1
FIGURE 6. An example showing that the result in Theorem 4.9 is sharp.
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An interesting property of the example in Figure 6 is that the set {0, 1, 2} of values of the utility
functions is very small. The problem of existence and construction of an mms-allocation with this
set of values was studied in the original version of the mms-allocation problem (i.e. for complete
graphs in our terminology). Amanatidis et al. [1] proved that unlike in the case of a cycle (see
Figure 6) for a complete graph an mms-allocation with {0, 1, 2} as the set of values of the utility
functions always exists.
It is also easy to show that if {0, 1} is the set of values of the utility functions, then an mms-
allocation for a cycle always exists and can be constructed in polynomial time. An analogous
statement for complete graphs was observed earlier by Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre [4].
As we have seen earlier, even for three agents mms-allocations of goods on a cycle may not exist.
Theorem 4.9 implies that when allocating goods on a cycle to three agents, we can guarantee that
each agent receives a bundle worth at least 3
4
of her maximin share. We will now show that this
guarantee can be strengthened to 5
6
. Re-examining the example in Figure 2 shows that this is the
best guarantee we can get. To see this, we recall that in this case the maximin share value for agents
1 and 2 is 5 and for agent 3 is 6. In particular, any split in which an agent 1 or 2 obtains a bundle
consisting of two or fewer items is at best a 4
5
-sufficient allocation (indeed, any two consecutive
items have the total value of no more than 4). Thus, in any c-sufficient allocation with c ≥ 5
6
, agents
1 and 2 receive bundles of at least three items. If agent 3 receives at least three items, then all agents
obtain bundles of exactly three items. There are only three such allocations. It is easy to see that
one of them is 4
5
-sufficient and the other two are 5
6
-sufficient. Since any two consecutive items
have the total value at most 5 for agent 3, any allocation in which agent 3 receives no more than
2 items is at best 5
6
-sufficient (some of them are actually 5
6
-sufficient; for instance, the allocation
{v4, v5, v6}, {v7, v8, v9, v1}, {v2, v3}.
To show that a 5
6
-sufficient allocation of goods on a cycle always exists for 3 agents we start by
introducing some additional terminology and two lemmas. Let C be a cycle, N = {1, 2, 3} a set of
agents and ui the utility function of an agent i = 1, 2, 3. To simplify notation, we call an mms-split
for (C, 3, ui) anmms(i)-split and we recall that we writemms(i) as a shorthand formms
(3)(C, ui).
Lemma 4.10. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Let c, 0 < c ≤ 1, be a real
number. If for some agent i ∈ N two different bundles of an mms(i)-split of C are of value at least
c ·mms(j) to an agent j, where j 6= i, then there is a c-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents
in N .
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that i = 1 and j = 2. Let us observe that for any
agent and any 3-split of the cycle there is a bundle of value at least one third of the total value of all
goods for this agent. The value of this bundle is larger than or equal to the maximin share for this
agent. In particular, the value of one of the bundles of any mms(1)-split is greater than or equal
to mms(3). The following protocol finds a c-sufficient allocation. Agent 3 picks a bundle of the
mms(1)-split that has value at least mms(3) to her. At least one of the remaining two bundles has
value at least c ·mms(2) to agent 2. That bundle is allocated to agent 2. The remaining bundle of
the split is assigned to agent 1. 
Lemma 4.11. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Let c, 0 < c ≤ 1, be a real
number. If for some two different agents i, j ∈ N , the intersection of a bundle of an mms(i)-split
and a bundle of an mms(j)-split of C has value at least c ·mms(i) to the agent i, then there is a
c-sufficient allocation of goods in C to agents in N .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1 and j = 2. Let A and B be bundles of
mms-splits for agents 1 and 2, respectively, such that Q = A ∩ B has value at least c ·mms(1) to
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the agent 1. The set B − Q consists of one or two intervals, the latter in the case when A ⊂ B.
Clearly, the elements in B − Q can be added to the remaining two bundles (different from B) of
the mms(2)-split so that to form a 2-split of C − Q, say B′, B′′, with both parts of value at least
mms(2) for the agent 2.
We construct a c-sufficient allocation as follows. If u3(Q) ≥ c · mms(3), then we allocate Q
to agent 3. Since Q ⊆ A, C − Q contains the remaining two bundles (different from A) of the
mms(1)-split. Hence, u1(C − Q) ≥ 2 · mms(1). Since C − Q = B′ ∪ B′′, at least one of the
bundles B′ and B′′ is worth mms(1) or more to the agent 1. We allocate that bundle to that agent
and we allocate the remaining one to the agent 2.
If u3(Q) < c · mms(3), then the agent 1 gets Q. Since u3(C) ≥ 3 · mms(3) and c ≤ 1,
u3(C − Q) > 2 · mms(3). Thus, at least one bundle of B′ and B′′ is worth mms(3) or more to
agent 3. That bundle goes to the agent 3 and the remaining one to agent 2. 
We are now ready to prove that if goods on a cycle are allocated to three agents, then each agent
can be guaranteed a bundle worth at least 5
6
of her maximin share.
Theorem 4.12. Let C be a cycle and N = {1, 2, 3} a set of agents. Then, a 5
6
-sufficient allocation
of goods in C to agents in N exists.
Proof. Because of Proposition 2.3, we restrict attention to the case when the set N of agents is
regular. It follows that each agent values all goods on C at 3 and that all agents are proportional. In
particular, mms(i) = 1, for every agent i ∈ N .
Let Π1 = A1, A2, A3, Π2 = B1, B2, B3 and Π3 = C1, C2, C3 be mms-splits for agents 1, 2 and
3, respectively. If a bundle of one of these splits is contained in a bundle of another split, then an
mms-allocation (and consequently a 5
6
-sufficient allocation) exists, by Lemma 4.11 (applied to the
two bundles and c = 1).
From now on we assume that there are no such containments. Then, we can relabel the parts of
the splits Π1, Π2 and Π3 so that the sets A⌈(k+2)/3⌉ ∩ B⌈(k+1)/3⌉ ∩ C⌈k/3⌉, k = 1, 2, . . . , 9 (indices
are computed modulo 3 with respect to the set {1, 2, 3}) form a split of the cycle. Let us call these
9 sets chunks.
Since each agent i ∈ N values C at 3, any split of C into three bundles contains at least one
bundle of value at least 1 to i, that is, of value at least mms(i) to i. In particular, such a bundle
can be found in the mms-splits of the two agents other than i. Moreover, if for some two agents
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, more than one part in Πi has value at least 1 (= mms(j)) for j, then we are done
by Lemma 4.10.
Let i, j, k ∈ N be three different agents. We observe that if a bundle of Πk of value at least 1
(= mms(i)) for the agent i is different from a part of Πk of value at least 1 (= mms(j)) for the
agent j, then we can easily distribute the parts of Πk among the agents to get an mms-allocation.
So, we assume that for every agent i there is a unique bundle in Πi whose value for each of the
remaining two agents is at least 1. Let us call this bundle i-significant.
One can readily observe that, for i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, the intersection of the i-significant bundle and
the j-significant bundle consists of either two chunks, one chunk or is empty. Moreover, it is not
possible for each of the three pairs of different significant bundles to intersect on one chunk. Thus,
there is a pair i, j ∈ N of agents such that the i-significant bundle and the j-significant bundle are
disjoint or intersect on two chunks. We will consider these two cases separately. Clearly, we can
assume without loss of generality that i = 1, j = 2 and that As and Bt, s, t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the
1-significant and 2-significant bundles, respectively,
Case 1 As and Bt are disjoint.
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We will not lose generality, either, if we assume that As = A1 and Bt = B2. Let us consider the
mms-split Π3. By the definition of significant bundles, the value for the agent 3 of each of the sets
A1 and B2 is at least 1.
If the value of A2 or A3 for the agent 3 is at least
5
6
, then a 5
6
-sufficient allocation exists by
Lemma 4.10. Moreover, if the value for the agent 3 of the set A1 ∩ C3 is at least 56 , then a 56-
sufficient allocation exists by Lemma 4.11.
So, let us assume that the values for the agent 3 of the sets A2, A3 and A1 ∩ C3 are all smaller
than 5
6
. Then the value of the chunk A1 ∩ B1 ∩ C1 is larger than 3− 3 · 56 = 12 .
In a very similar way we show that if any of the sets B1, B3, B2 ∩ C2 has value at least 56 for
the agent 3, then a 5
6
-sufficient allocation exists. Otherwise, the value for the agent 3 of the chunk
A2 ∩ B2 ∩ C1 is larger than 12 .
Then, however, the value for the agent 3 of the part C1, which contains the chunks A1 ∩B1 ∩C1
and A2 ∩ B2 ∩ C1 is larger than 1, a contradiction because the agents are proportional.
Case 2 As and Bt intersect on two chunks.
We assume without loss of generality thatAs = A1 andBt = B1. By the definition of significant
bundles, the value for the agent 3 of each of the bundles A1 and B1 is at least 1.
Reasoning in exactly the same way as in the first case, we conclude that either a 5
6
-sufficient
allocation exists or the value for the agent 3 of the chunk A1 ∩ B1 ∩ C1 is larger than 12 .
Let us then assume the latter. We observe that as in Case 1, if any of the bundles B2, B3, B1∩C1
has value at least 5
6
for the agent 3, then a 5
6
-sufficient allocation exists (by Lemma 4.10 or 4.11).
Otherwise, the value for the agent 3 of the chunk A1 ∩ B1 ∩ C3 is larger than 12 .
Then, however, the value for the agent 3 of the set A1 ∩B1 = (A1 ∩B1 ∩C1)∪ (A1 ∩B1 ∩C3)
is larger than 1. In this case an mms-allocation exists because we can assign A2 to the agent 1,
B3 ∪ (A3 ∩ B2 ∩ C2) to the agent 2 and A1 ∩ B1 to the agent 3. 
For more than three agents a 5
6
-sufficient allocation of goods on a cycle may not exist. The exam-
ple in Figure 5 shows that this may be the case even for agents of two types only. For this example,
we have already observed that there is a 3
4
-sufficient allocation but no c-sufficient allocation for
c > 3
4
.
We close this section by commenting on the problem of computing c-sufficient allocations. First,
we note that all proofs we presented in this section, as well as the proof of Theorem 4.9, which we
give in the appendix, yield algorithms for constructing c-sufficient allocations. These constructions
apply to the case of regular sets of agents and require that both maximin shares and mms-splits be
computed for every agent. Given those, the actual construction of a c-sufficient allocation provided
in each proof can clearly be implemented to run in polynomial time. We recall that in the case of
goods on a cycle, maximin shares and mms-splits can be computed in polynomial time. It follows
then by Corollary 3.12 that in all cases we discussed in this section when c-sufficient allocations
exist, they can be computed by algorithms running in polynomial times.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated maximin share allocations in the graph setting for the fair division problem of
indivisible goods proposed by Bouveret et al. [2]. That paper settled the case of trees by showing
that maximin share allocations of goods on trees always exist and can be computed in polynomial
time. It also gave an example of goods on a cycle to be distributed to four agents where no maximin
share allocation exists.
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Our work focused on cycles. We found several cases when maximin share allocations on cycles
exist and can be found in polynomial time. For some other cases, when maximin share allocations
are not guaranteed to exist, we found polynomial-time algorithms deciding the existence of max-
imin share allocations and, if they do exist, computing them, too. Interestingly, we do not know the
complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations on cycles. We proved that the
problem is in NP but whether it is NP-hard is open.
In general, understanding the complexity of deciding the existence of maximin share allocations
of goods on graphs is a major challenge. We improved an earlier upper bound from ΣP2 down to
∆P2 but, as in the case of cycles, we do not have any hardness results. Establishing such results
and characterizing classes of graphs for which deciding the existence of maximin share allocations
is in P, is NP-complete or goes beyond NP (under the assumption, of course, that the polynomial
hierarchy does not collapse) are important open problems.
Perhaps our most interesting results concern the existence of allocations guaranteeing each agent
a given fraction of her maximin share. For instance, we show that for three agents one can always
find an allocation giving each agent at least 5/6 of her maximin share. For an arbitrary number of
agents of two or three types, we show allocations giving each agent 3/4 of the maximin share, and
we also obtain some results for the case when the number of types is larger than three. Moreover,
in each case, these allocations can be found by polynomial-time algorithms. We conjecture that in
the general case of any number of agents there exist allocations guaranteeing all agents at least 3/4
of their maximin share. Theorems 4.8 and 4.9 show the conjecture holds if agents are of three or
fewer types. However, the methods we developed so far seem too weak to prove it in full generality.
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APPENDIX - PROOF OF THEOREM 4.9
In this section we prove Theorem 4.9. We adhere to the notation we used throughout the paper.
In particular, we consider a setN = {1, 2 . . . , n} of agents of three types and a cycleC ofm goods.
In the proof, as in several other places in the paper, we work under the assumption that agents are
regular. Thus, their mms-splits consist of non-empty bundles. Therefore, in our auxiliary results,
concerning properties of splits, we restrict attention to splits into non-empty bundles, that is, to
splits that are partitions.
We select and fix an element a inC and call it an anchor. Whenever we say thatX = X1, . . . , Xn
is a split we we mean that it is a split ofC and, assume that a ∈ X1 and that partsXi are enumerated
according to their location on the cycle as we traverse it clockwise. Further, for every i = 1, . . . , n,
we writeXi for the set of all elements in the segment ofC extending from the anchor a clockwise to
the last element of Xi (inclusive). We also assume that arithmetic expressions appearing in indices
labeling bundles in splits are evaluated modulo n; in particular, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i+n = i.
Finally, we call any set of a split X an X-set.
Assuming these conventions, let X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn be two splits. A bundle
Xi is a jump to the split Y if Xi ⊆ Yi. In such case, we will also say that Xi is a jump to Yi+1. We
usually omit the reference to the target split of a jump, if it is clear from the context. The following
property follows directly from the definition.
Lemma 5.1. Let X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn be two splits. Then for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
at least one of the setsXi, Yi is a jump (to the other split).
Lemma 5.2. Let X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn be two splits. If for some i, 1 ≤ i < n, Xi
is a jump andXi+1 is not a jump, then Yi+1 ⊆ Xi+1 and Yi+1 is a jump.
Proof. SinceXi is a jump,Xi ⊆ Yi. Further, sinceXi+1 is not a jump, Yi+1 is a jump (Lemma 5.1).
Thus, Yi+1 ⊆ Xi+1. Since Xi+1 = Xi+1 \ Xi and Yi+1 = Yi+1 \ Yi, Yi+1 ⊆ Xi+1 follows. 
LetX = X1, . . . , Xn be a sequence of n subsets ofC. AnX -interval is any sequenceXi, Xi+1 . . . , Xj
of up to n consecutive elements of X (with X1 being a successor of Xn).
Let X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn be two splits. A sequence Z = Z1, . . . , Zn of subsets
of C is XY-useful if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, at least one of the following conditions holds:
(1) Zi = Xi and Zi+1 = Xi+1
(2) Zi = Yi and Zi+1 = Yi+1
(3) Zi = Xi and Xi is a jump to Yi+1
(4) Zi = Yi and Yi is a jump to Xi+1.
Lemma 5.3. Let X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn be splits. If a sequence Z = Z1, . . . , Zn is
XY-useful then the sets in Z are pairwise disjoint.
Proof. Let us consider sets Zi and Zj , where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. From the definition of a XY-useful
sequence, it follows that for every k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, Zk = Xk or Zk = Yk. Thus, Zi = Xi and
Zj = Xj , Zi = Yi and Zj = Yj , Zi = Xi and Zj = Yj , or Zi = Yi and Zj = Xj . In the first
two cases, the sets Zi and Zj are disjoint, because they are two different members of a split. The
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other two cases are symmetric. Without loss of generality, we will restrict attention to the last one:
Zi = Yi and Zj = Xj .Clearly, we may assume that Zi 6= Xi and Zj 6= Yj (otherwise, Zi and Zj
would be members of the same split, the case we already considered).
Let k be the largest integer such that i ≤ k < j, Zk = Yk, and Zk+1 6= Yk+1. Since Zi = Yi, k
is well defined. It follows that Yk is a jump. Thus, Yk ⊆ Xk. Since k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Xj ∩ Xk = ∅.
Consequently, Xj ∩ Yk = ∅. Since i ≤ k, if i ≥ 2 then Zi ⊆ Yk (indeed, it follows from the
equality Zi = Yi). Thus, Zi and Zj are disjoint.
Let us assume then that i = 1. Since the anchor a belongs to Y1, Y1 is the union of two segments,
A = C \ Yn and B = Y1. Since Xj ∩ Yk = ∅, Xj ∩ B = ∅. Let p be the smallest integer such
that j ≤ p ≤ n, Zp = Xp and Zp+1 6= Xp+1. Since Zj = Xj and Z1 6= X1 (we proved Zi 6= Xi
above and here i = 1), p is well defined. It follows that Xp is a jump. Therefore, Xp ⊆ Yp. Since
Yp ⊆ Yn, A ∩ Yp = ∅. Since Xj ⊆ Xp ⊆ Yp, Xj ∩ A = ∅. Thus, Zj(= Xj) and Z1(= Y1) are
disjoint. 
Splits X and Y are proper relative to each other if for every X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y , X 6⊆ Y and
Y 6⊆ X . The following lemma provides some basic properties of splits that are proper relative to
each other (they are easy to see and we omit the proof).
Lemma 5.4. Let splits X = X1, . . . , Xn and Y = Y1, . . . , Yn, with both sequences enumerated
according to our convention clockwise starting with sets containing the anchor a, be proper relative
to each other. Then for every i = 1, . . . , n,
(1) Xi ⊆ Yi ∪ Yi+1 and Yi ⊆ Xi−1 ∪Xi, and
(2) Xi−1 ∩ Yi 6= ∅,Xi ∩ Yi 6= ∅, andXi ∩ Yi+1 6= ∅.
or for every i = 1, . . . , n,
(1) Xi ⊆ Yi−1 ∪ Yi and Yi ⊆ Xi ∪Xi+1, and
(2) Xi ∩ Yi−1 6= ∅,Xi ∩ Yi 6= ∅, andXi+1 ∩ Yi 6= ∅.
From now on we consider splits that are mms-splits for a set N of regular agents. In particular,
all agents are proportional and for every agent the total utility of all goods in C is n. We also use
the following terminology. A subset X of C that induces in C a connected subgraph is acceptable
to an agent x if the total value of the goods inX to x is at least 3
4
.
Lemma 5.5. Let x and y be two regular agents from N . Let X and Y be mms-splits of a cycle for
agents x and y, respectively, and let X and Y be proper relative to each other. If no set X ∩ Y ,
where X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y , is acceptable to y, then at least one of each pair of consecutive sets of
X is acceptable to y.
Proof. To prove the lemma let us consider any two consecutive sets in X , say X and X ′, with X ′
directly following X in X . Since X and Y are proper relative to each other, Lemma 5.4 implies
that there are three consecutive sets Y, Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ Y such that X ∪X ′ ⊆ Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Y ′′. Let X−1 and
X ′+1 be the predecessor of X in X and the successor of X ′ in X , respectively. By our assumption,
uy(X−1 ∩ Y ) < 34 and uy(X ′+1 ∩ Y ′′) < 34 , where uy is the utility function for agent y. It follows
that
3 = uy(Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ Y ′′)
= uy(X−1 ∩ Y ) + uy(X) + uy(X ′) + uy(X ′+1 ∩ Y ′′)
< 2 · 3
4
+ uy(X) + uy(X
′).
Thus, uy(X) ≥ 34 or uy(X ′) ≥ 34 , that is, at least one ofX and X ′ is acceptable to y. 
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In the next lemma and in the proof of Theorem 4.9, we use the following notation. We write
n1, n2, n3 for the numbers of agents of types i1, i2, i3, respectively. In particular, n = n1+n2+n3.
Further, we assume without loss of generality that n1 ≥ n2 ≥ n3 ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.6. Let A = A1, . . . , An (resp. B = B1, . . . , Bn and C = C1, . . . , Cn) be mms-splits of
the cycle C for agents of type i1 (resp. i2 and i3). If n1 = n2, n3 ≥ 1, no set Ai ∩ Bj is acceptable
to any agent, and some C-set is contained in some A-set or B-set, then there is a 3
4
-sufficient
allocation for a cycle and any number of agents of three types.
Proof. Since no set Ai ∩ Bj is acceptable to any agent, we have that for every i and j, where
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Ai 6⊆ Bj and Bi 6⊆ Aj . Thus, the splitsA and B are proper relative to each other.
Our assumptions do not distinguish between the splits A and B. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we may assume that a C-set, say Ck, is contained in an A-set, say Ai. Let Bj and Bj+1
be twoB-sets that intersectAi. It follows thatCk ⊆ Bj∪Bj+1. IfCk ⊆ Bj+1, thenCk ⊆ Ai∩Bj+1.
But then Ai ∩ Bj+1 would be acceptable to agents of type i3 (and there is at least one such agent).
This is a contradiction. Thus, Ck ∩ Bj 6= ∅. Consequently, Ck ∩ Bj ∩ Ai 6= ∅. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that the anchor a belongs to Ck ∩ Bj ∩ Ai. Assuming the sets in the
splitsA, B and C are enumerated with respect to that anchor, we have k = j = i = 1, C1 ⊆ A1 and
B1 ⊆ An ∪ A1. The latter implies (we recall that A and B are proper relative to each other and so,
Lemma 5.4 applies) that for every i = 1, . . . , n,
Ai ⊆ Bi ∪ Bi+1 and Bi ⊆ Ai−1 ∪Ai.
In what follows we will be applying Lemmas 5.1 - 5.5. We can do so, as we follow here the same
convention for enumerating sets in splits with respect to the same fixed anchor.
Case 1 Some two consecutive A-sets are jumps to C.
If all A-sets are jumps to C, then the sequence
Z = C1, A2, . . . , A2n1+1, C2n1+2, . . . , Cn
is AC-useful. Indeed, C1 is a jump as it is a subset of A1 (thus, C1 ⊆ A1, in the notation we
introduced to define jumps), and A2n1+1 is a jump by assumption. By Lemma 5.3, all sets in Z are
pairwise disjoint.
By assumption, no set Ai ∩ Bj is acceptable to any agent of type i2. Thus, by Lemma 5.5, some
n1(= n2) of different sets in the interval A2, . . . , A2n1+1 in Z are acceptable to agents of type i2.
We assign them to those agents. We assign the remaining n1 sets in A2, . . . , A2n1+1 to agents of
type i1. Finally, we assign the sets Cj , j = 1, 2n1 + 2, . . . , n, to agents of type i3. In this way all
agents are allocated sets that are acceptable to them. If there are any unallocated goods (Z does not
have to cover all goods in C), they can be distributed to agents so that all agents receive bundles
inducing in C a path. This, yields an assignment that is a 3
4
-sufficient allocation.
So, assume that some of A-sets are not jumps. Since some two consecutive A-sets are jumps,
there is an integer i such that Ai−1 and Ai are jumps andAi+1 is not. By Lemma 5.2, Ci+1 is a jump
and Ci+1 ⊆ Ai+1. The latter property implies that we may relabel sets Ai and Ci so that An−1 and
An are jumps and A1 is not. Indeed, under this relabeling we have C1 ⊆ A1, which we assumed to
hold when we started the proof (of course, we also need to relabel sets Bi correspondingly).
We now consider the case when Cn3 or Cn3−1 is a jump. In the first case, we set
Z = C1, . . . , Cn3, An3+1, . . . , An
and, in the second case,
Z = Cn, C1, . . . , Cn3−1, An3 , . . . , An−1.
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Since An and An−1 are jumps, in either case Z is AC-useful. Thus, by Lemma 5.3, its elements
are pairwise disjoint. Reasoning as above, we distribute the sets An3+1, . . . , An (respectively,
An3, . . . , An−1) among 2n1 agents of types i1 and i2 (since n = 2n1 + n3, in each case there
are 2n1 sets in that sequence), and then allocate the remaining n3 sets, all of them C-sets, to agents
of type i3. Clearly, the resulting allocation (after possibly attaching goods not “covered” by Z to
appropriate sets in Z) is 3
4
-sufficient.
Next, let us assume that neither Cn3 nor Cn3−1 is a jump. Then let k be the largest integer such
that 1 ≤ k < n3 − 1 and Ck is a jump (such k exists because C1 is a jump). Moreover, let ℓ be the
smallest integer j such that n3 < j ≤ n and Cj is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n, otherwise.
Observe that the sequence
Z = C1, . . . , Ck, Ak+1, . . . , Aℓ−(n3−k), Cℓ−(n3−k)+1, . . . , Cℓ, Aℓ+1 . . . , An
is AC-useful. Indeed, for k < j < ℓ the sets Cj are not jumps. By Lemma 5.1, the sets Aj , where
k < j < ℓ are jumps. Since k < ℓ − (n3 − k) < ℓ, Aℓ−(n3−k) is a jump. Moreover, Ck is a jump
based by our choice of k, Cℓ is a jump by our choice of ℓ, if ℓ is not assigned to n by default, and
An is a jump by assumption. By Lemma 5.3, all sets in Z are pairwise disjoint.
Clearly, if ℓ and n(= 2n1 + n3) have the same parity, then the numbers of sets in the intervals
Ak+1, . . . , Aℓ−(n3−k) and Aℓ+1, . . . , An are even (the latter is present and needs to be considered
only if ℓ < n). Moreover, the total number of sets in these two intervals is n − n3 = 2n1 = 2n2.
By Lemma 5.5, we can select among these A-sets in Z n1(= n2) sets that are acceptable to agents
of type i2. We allocate these sets to those agents. We then allocate the remaining n1 of these A-sets
to the agents of type i1. Finally, agents of type i3 receive the n3 C-sets of Z . Extending Z to an
allocation of C, yields an allocation that is 3
4
-sufficient.
So, assume now that ℓ and n have different parity. In this case, we define ℓ′ to be the smallest
integer j such that n3 < j ≤ n − 1 and Cj is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ′ = n − 1 otherwise.
Obviously, ℓ′ = ℓ or ℓ′ = n − 1, so in both cases ℓ′ and n have different parity. Since An−1 is a
jump, the same reasoning as above yields that the sequence
Z =
Cn, C1, . . . , Ck, Ak+1, . . . , Aℓ′−(n3−k)+1, Cℓ′−(n3−k)+2, . . . , Cℓ′, Aℓ′+1 . . . , An−1
isAC-useful. Thus, its elements are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, theA-intervalsAk+1, . . . , Aℓ′−(n3−k)+1
and Aℓ′+1, . . . , An−1 (if ℓ
′ < n− 1) consist of even numbers of sets and the total number of sets in
these two intervals is 2n1 = 2n2. Therefore, we can define
3
4
-sufficient allocation in a similar way
as when ℓ and n have the same parity.
Case 2 Some two consecutive C-sets are jumps to A.
This case is symmetric to the previous one if we enumerate sets counterclockwise rather than
clockwise. Indeed, if a C-set X is a jump to an A-set Y under the clockwise enumeration, then Y
is a jump toX under the counterclockwise enumeration.
Case 3 No two consecutive A-sets are jumps to C, and no two consecutive C-sets are jumps to A.
Since C1 ⊆ A1, C1 is a jump. It follows that Cn ∩ A1 6= ∅ as otherwise, Cn would be a jump. In
particular, Cn 6⊆ An. Applying Lemma 5.2 repeatedly, yields that for all odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ci ⊆ Ai
and for every even i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ Ci. Further, since Cn 6⊆ An, it follows that n is even.
We will now show that the splits B and C are proper relative to each other. To this end, we need
to show that for every i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Ci 6⊆ Bj and Bj 6⊆ Ci. First, let us assume that
Ci ⊆ Bj , for some i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. If Ai ⊆ Ci, then Ai ⊆ Bj , a contradiction as the splits
A and B are proper relative to each other. If Ci ⊆ Ai, then Ci ⊆ Ai ∩ Bj . Therefore, Ai ∩ Bj is
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acceptable to agents of type i3, a contradiction with the assumptions of the lemma. Thus, for every
i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Ci 6⊆ Bj .
Next, let us assume that Bj ⊆ Ci, for some i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. If i is odd, then Ci ⊆ Ai. It
follows that Bj ⊆ Ai, a contradiction with the fact that A and B are proper relative to each other.
Thus, i is even, so Bj ⊆ Ci ⊆ Ci−1 ∪ Ci ∪ Ci+1 ⊆ Ai−1 ∪ Ai ∪ Ai+1. We recall that we have
Bj ⊆ Aj−1 ∪ Aj . Hence, j = i or j = i+ 1.
Let us assume that j = i. Since i is even, Ci−1 ⊆ Ai−1 ⊆ Bi−1 ∪ Bi. Moreover, Bi ⊆ Ci, so
Bi ∩ Ci−1 = ∅. Thus, Ci−1 ⊆ Bi−1, a contradiction with what we already proved above. It follows
that we must have j = i + 1. In this case we similarly get, Ci+1 ⊆ Ai+1 ⊆ Bi+1 ∪ Bi+2 and
Bi+1 ⊆ Ci (so, Bi+1 ∩ Ci+1 = ∅). Thus, Ci+1 ⊆ Bi+2, a contradiction as in the case j = i. This
completes the proof that for every i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Bj 6⊆ Ci, and show that the splits B
and C are proper relative to each other.
Let us observe that B1 ⊆ An ∪ A1, An ⊆ Cn, B1 ∩ C1 6= ∅ and C1 6⊆ B1. It follows that
B1 ⊆ Cn ∪ C1. Since the splits B and C are proper relative to each other, Lemma 5.4 implies that
for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Bi ⊆ Ci−1 ∪ Ci.
Let us suppose that some set Bi ∩ Cj , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, is acceptable for agents of type i2.
Then, there is i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that Bi ∩ Ci−1 or Bi ∩ Ci has this property.
Let us assume the former. We define a 3
4
-sufficient allocation as follows. We consider the se-
quence Ci, Ci+1, . . . , Ci+n3 of n3+1 C-sets. One of the sets Ci, Ci+1 contains an A-set and that set
is assigned to an agent of type i1. The remaining n3 sets of that sequence go to agents of type i3.
The sequence Bi−1, Bi−2, . . . , Bi−(2n1−2) contains at least n1 − 1 sets acceptable for agents of type
i1 (Lemma 5.5). We select some n1−1 of such sets and assign them to agents of type i1. We allocate
the remaining n1−1 sets from this sequence and the setBi∩Ci−1 to agents of type i2. In this way, all
agents are allocated sets that are acceptable to them. Moreover, these sets are pairwise disjoint. In-
deed, the setsCi+n3 andBi−(2n1−2) do not overlap because i−(2n1−2) = i+n−2n1+2 = i+n3+2
(we recall that the arithmetic of indices is modulo n), and Bi+n3+2 ⊆ Ci+n3+1∪Ci+n3+2. Thus, the
assignment is a 3
4
-sufficient allocation.
The latter case, when Bi ∩ Ci is acceptable to an agent of type i2 can be handled similarly by
considering sequences Ci−1, Ci−2, . . . , Ci−(n3+1) and Bi+1, Bi+2, . . . , Bi+2n1−2.
Assume now that no set Bi ∩ Cj is acceptable for agents of type i2. By Lemma 5.5 one in every
two consecutive sets of the mms-split C1, . . . , Cn is acceptable for agents of type i2. Clearly, An is
a jump to the split C because C1 ⊆ A1. Moreover, Cn3 ⊆ An3 or Cn3+1 ⊆ An3+1. Therefore, Cn3+j
is a jump for some j ∈ {0, 1}. It follows that the sequence
Z = C1, . . . , Cn3+j , An3+j+1, . . . , An
is AC-useful. By the comment above, at least j sets in C1, . . . , Cn3+j are acceptable to agents of
type i2 (since n3 ≥ 1). We assign j of these sets to agents of type i2. The remaining n3 sets
of C1, . . . , Cn3+j are assigned to agents of type i3. Next, the sets An3+j+1, . . . , An are distributed
among agents of types i1 and i2. Agents of type i2 take n2 − j sets of this interval (there are this
many sets acceptable to agents of type i2 because
⌊
n−n3−j
2
⌋
=
⌊
2n2−j
2
⌋ ≥ n2 − j). The agents
of type i1 receive the remaining n1 sets of the A-interval. By construction, this allocation is
3
4
-
sufficient. 
Theorem 4.9. Let C be a cycle of goods and N a set of agents of at most three types. Then, a
3
4
-sufficient allocation of goods on C to agents in N exists.
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Proof. We adhere to the notation from Lemma 5.6. Further, as there, we assume that n3 ≥ 1
(otherwise, we are in the case of agents of two types settled by Theorem 4.8). We now consider
several cases. In each case we assume that none of the cases considered earlier applies.
Case 1. Some set Ai ∩Bj is acceptable to some agent.
In this case, the existence of a 3
4
-sufficient allocation follows directly from Lemma 4.6.
From now on, we assume Case 1 does not apply, that is, no set Ai ∩ Bj is acceptable to any
agent. It follows that for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, Ai 6⊆ Bj and Bj 6⊆ Ai. Thus, the splits A and B are
proper relative to each other. This means, in particular, that from now on we may apply Lemma 5.5
to splitsA and B, as well as to B and A.
Case 2. Some C-set is contained in some A-set.
Given our comments above, Lemma 5.6 applies and we can assume that n1 > n2 ≥ n3. We can
also assume without loss of generality that C1 ⊆ A1. Then, the sets An and C1 are jumps.
If the set Cn3 is a jump too, then the sequence
Z = C1, . . . , Cn3, An3+1, . . . , An
is AC-useful. By Lemma 5.5 (which also applies now), at least ⌊n1+n2
2
⌋ ≥ n2 of the sets that form
the sequence An3+1, . . . , An are acceptable for agents of type i2. We assign n2 of them to these
agents. We assign the remaining n1 sets of this interval to agents of type i1. Agents of type i3
receive the sets C1, . . . , Cn3 . In this way, we construct a
3
4
-sufficient allocation.
If Cn3 is not a jump, then let k be the largest integer such that 1 ≤ k < n3 and Ck is a jump (such
k exists because C1 is a jump). Moreover, let ℓ be the smallest integer j such that n3 < j ≤ n and
Cj is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n otherwise. We define
Z = C1, . . . , Ck, Ak+1, . . . , Aℓ−(n3−k), Cℓ−(n3−k)+1, . . . , Cℓ, Aℓ+1 . . . , An
and observe that it is AC-useful. Indeed, Ck is a jump by the construction. Further, k < ℓ− (n3 −
k) < ℓ and for k < j < ℓ the sets Cj are not jumps. Thus, Aℓ−(n3−k) is a jump by Lemma 5.1.
Finally, if ℓ < n, Cℓ is a jump by the choice of ℓ and An is a jump by assumption.
By Lemma 5.5, there are at least
⌊
ℓ−n3
2
⌋
+
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋ ≥ ℓ−n3−1
2
+ n−ℓ−1
2
= n1+n2
2
− 1 > n2 − 1
sets in the intervals Ak+1, . . . , Aℓ−(n3−k) and Aℓ+1 . . . , An (the latter present only if ℓ < n) that are
acceptable to agents of type i2. We assign n2 of them to these agents. The remaining sets of these
intervals (there are n1 of them) are assigned to agents of type i1. Finally, agents of type i3 receive
the sets in the intervals C1, . . . , Ck and Cℓ−(n3−k)+1, . . . , Cℓ. This yields a
3
4
-sufficient allocation.
Case 3. Some A-set is contained in some C-set.
Without loss of generality we may assume that A1 ⊆ C1. Since no C-set is contained in an
A-set (that possibility is excluded by Case 2), a simple inductive argument shows that for every
i = 2, . . . , n, Ai ends strictly before Ci does. In particular, An ends strictly before Cn does. This
implies that A1 ∩ Cn 6= ∅, a contradiction with A1 ⊆ C1 (and the fact that different sets in a split
are disjoint).
Given Cases 2 and 3, from now on we may assume that the splits A and C are proper relative to
each other.
Case 4. Some set Ai ∩ Cj is acceptable to agents of type i3.
As we noted, we may assume that the splitsA and C proper are relative to each other. Thus, we can
relabel the sets in the split C if necessary so that for all i, Ai ⊆ Ci ∪ Ci+1 and, consequently, also
Ci ⊆ Ai−1 ∪ Ai.
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We can assume without loss of generality that A1 ∩ C1 or An ∩ C1 is acceptable to agents of type
i3. Let us assume the former. We allocateA1∩C1 and the sets C2, C3, . . . , Cn3 to agents of type i3.
Clearly, all these sets are included in A1∪ . . .∪An3 . The sequence An3+1, . . . , An of the remaining
A-sets contains n1 + n2 sets. By Lemma 5.5, at least
⌊
n1+n2
2
⌋ ≥ n2 of them are acceptable for
agents of type i2. We allocate any n2 of those sets to agents of type i2 and the remaining n1 of them
to the agents of type i1. The allocation we defined in this way extends to a
3
4
-sufficient allocation
for C.
The other case, when An ∩ C1 is acceptable to agents of type i3, can be handled similarly by
considering sequences Cn, Cn−1, . . . , Cn−n3+2 and A1, A2, . . . , An−n3 .
Excluding Cases 1-4 means in particular that A and C are proper relative to each other and that
no set Ai ∩ Cj is acceptable to agents of type i3. Therefore, from now on we may apply Lemma
5.5 also to the splits A and C.
Case 5. n1 ≥
⌊
n
2
⌋
.
LetAi be anyA-set acceptable to an agent of type i3. Such sets exist by Lemma 5.5. Without loss of
generality we may assume thatAn is acceptable to an agent of type i3. By Lemma 5.5, the sequence
A1, A2, . . . , A2n2 contains n2 sets that are acceptable to agents of type i2. We allocate these sets to
them. Next, we consider the sequenceA2n2+1, A2n2+2, . . . , An−1 of n−1−2n2 sets that followA2n2 .
Since n1 ≥ ⌊n2 ⌋ = ⌈n−12 ⌉, we have ⌊n−12 ⌋ ≥ n2+n3−1. Thus, ⌊n−1−2n22 ⌋ ≥ n3−1. By Lemma 5.5,
it follows that some n3 − 1 sets in the sequence A2n2+1, A2n2+2, . . . , An−1 are acceptable to agents
of type i3. We allocate these sets and the set An to agents of type i3. We allocate the remaining n1
sets in A1, . . . , An to agents of type i1. This defines a
3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
Case 6. Some set Ai ∩ Cj is acceptable to agents of type i1 and n1 > n2.
By the same argument as in Case 4, we may assume that Ci ⊆ Ai−1 ∪Ai for all i and that A1 ∩C1
or An ∩ C1 is acceptable to agents of type i1. If A1 ∩ C1 is acceptable to agents of type i1, we
proceed as follows. We allocate the sets C2, C3, . . . , Cn3+1 to agents of type i3. Next, we note that
every other set in the sequence An3+2, An3+3, . . . , An is acceptable to agents of type i2. Since the
sequence contains n− n3− 1 = n1 + n2− 1 ≥ 2n2 sets (recall that we assume here that n1 > n2),
some n2 of the sets in the sequence are acceptable to agents of type i2. We allocate these n2 sets
to agents of type i2. We allocate the remaining n1 − 1 sets in that sequence and the set A1 ∩ C1 to
agents of type i1. In this way, all agents get sets that are acceptable to them. Further, we note that
C2 ∪ . . . ∪ Cn3+1 ⊆ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An3+1. It follows that all sets used in the allocation are pairwise
disjoint and so give rise to a 3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
The case when A1 ∩Cn is acceptable to an agent of type i1 follows from the one we just consid-
ered by the same argument as that used in Case 4.
Case 7. Some C-set is contained in some B-set.
By Lemma 5.6, we can assume that n1 > n2 (because Case 1 is excluded, A and B are proper
relative to each other and no set Ai ∩ Bj is acceptable to any agent). We now recall that splits C
and A are proper relative to each other. Moreover, no set Ai ∩ Cj is acceptable for agents of type
i1 (Case 6 is excluded). Thus, Lemma 5.5 applies to splits C and A and implies that every pair of
consecutive sets of the mms-split C1, . . . , Cn contains at least one set acceptable to agents of type
i1.
We can assume without loss of generality that C1 ⊆ B1. It follows that the sets Bn and C1 are
jumps. If the set C2n3 is a jump, then the sequence
Z1 = C1, . . . , C2n3, B2n3+1, . . . , Bn
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is BC-useful. Similarly, if the set C2n3−1 is a jump, then the sequence
Z2 = C1, . . . , C2n3−1, B2n3, . . . , Bn
is BC-useful.
Assume now that the sets C2n3−1 and C2n3 are not jumps. Let k, 1 ≤ k < 2n3− 1, be the largest
index such that Ck is a jump (since C1 is a jump, k is well defined), and let ℓ be the smallest integer
j such that 2n3 < j ≤ n and Cj is a jump, if such j exists, or ℓ = n otherwise.
We observe that the sequence
Z3 = C1, . . . , Ck, Bk+1, . . . , Bℓ−(2n3−k), Cℓ−(2n3−k)+1, . . . , Cℓ, Bℓ+1 . . . , Bn
is BC-useful. In particular the set Bℓ−(2n3−k) is a jump. Indeed, k < ℓ − (2n3 − k) < ℓ and for
k < j < ℓ the sets Cj are not jumps. By Lemma 5.1, the sets Bj are jumps.
It can be shown similarly that the sequence
Z4 = C1, . . . , Ck, Bk+1, . . . , Bℓ−(2n3−k)+1, Cℓ−(2n3−k)+2, . . . , Cℓ, Bℓ+1 . . . , Bn
is BC-useful.
We now observe that the sequence Z1 is a special case of the sequence Z3 for k = 2n3, and the
sequence Z2 is a special case of the sequence Z4 for k = 2n3− 1. Thus, to complete this case, it is
enough to describe allocations based on sequences Z3 and Z4.
For k even, we construct an allocation based on the sequence Z3 which, we recall is BC-useful.
Since no setAi∩Cj is acceptable for agents of type i1, by Lemma 5.5 half of the setsC1, . . . , Ck and
half of the setsCℓ−(2n3−k)+1, . . . , Cℓ (the number of sets in each of these intervals is even), n3 sets in
total, are acceptable for agents of type i1. We allocate these sets to agents of type i1. Agents of type
i3 receive the remaining n3 sets from these intervals. Since at least every other set of the intervals
Bk+1, . . . , Bℓ−(2n3−k) and Bℓ+1 . . . , Bn in Z5 is acceptable for agents of type i1 (by Lemma 5.5),
these two intervals contain at least
⌊
ℓ−2n3
2
⌋
+
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋
=
⌊
ℓ
2
⌋
+
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋−n3 ≥ ⌊n2⌋−1−n3 ≥ n1−n3
sets (because Case 5 is excluded,
⌊
n
2
⌋ ≥ n1+1) that are acceptable to agents of type i1. We allocate
n1 − n3 of these sets to the agents of type i1 that have not been allocated any set in the previous
stage. The remaining sets, there are n2 of them, are allocated to agents of type i2. Clearly, this
allocation gives rise to a 3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
For k odd, we construct an allocation based on theBC-useful sequenceZ4. By the same argument
as above, at least ⌊k
2
⌋ of the sets C1, . . . , Ck and at least ⌊2n3−k−12 ⌋ of the sets Cℓ−(2n3−k)+2, . . . , Cℓ
are acceptable for agents of type i1. Since k is odd, the total number of sets in the two sequences that
are acceptable to agents of type i1 is at least
k−1
2
+ 2n3−k−1
2
= n3−1. We select some n3−1 of these
sets and allocate them to n3−1 agents of type i1. The number of sets remaining in the two sequences
is n3. We allocate them to agents of type i3. Moreover, the intervals Bk+1, . . . , Bℓ−(2n3−k)+1 and
Bℓ+1 . . . , Bn contain at least
⌊
ℓ−2n3+1
2
⌋
+
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋
=
⌊
ℓ+1
2
⌋
+
⌊
n−ℓ
2
⌋−n3 ≥ ⌊n2⌋−n3 ≥ n1−n3+1
sets that are acceptable to agents of type i1 (as before, we use the fact that
⌊
n
2
⌋ ≥ n1 + 1). We
allocate some n1−n3+1 of these sets to agents of type i1 that have not been allocated a set before.
Finally, we allocate the remaining sets in these two sequences, there are n2 of them, to agents of
type i2. This allocation gives rise to a
3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
From now on, we will assume that no C-set is included in any B-set. Reasoning as in Case 3,
we can prove that also no B-set is included in any C-set. Thus, in the remaining part of the proof
we may assume that the splits B and C are proper relative to each other.
Case 8. Some set Bi ∩ Cj is acceptable to agents of type i3.
Since the splits B and C are proper relative to each other, we may relabel the sets if necessary so
that for all i, Bi ⊆ Ci ∪ Ci+1, and that B1 ∩ C1 or Bn ∩ C1 is acceptable for agents of type i3. We
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will consider the first case, that is, that B1 ∩ C1 is acceptable to agents of type i3. As in several
places before, the other case can be handled in a similar way.
Suppose first that n1 > n2. Since the conditions formulated in Cases 1 and 6 are not satisfied,
by Lemma 5.5 every other set in mms-splits B and C is acceptable to agents of type i1 (recall that
B and A are proper relative to each other and so are C and A). Thus, there are at least n3 − 1 sets
in the interval C2, C3, . . . , C2n3−1 that are acceptable to agents of type i1. We allocate these sets
to those agents. We allocate the remaining n3 − 1 the sets in this sequence and the set B1 ∩ C1
to agents of type i3. Similarly, we note that the sequence B2n3 , B2n3+1, . . . , Bn contains at least⌊
n−2n3+1
2
⌋ ≥ ⌊n
2
⌋ − n3 ≥ n1 − n3 + 1 sets that are acceptable to agents of type i1. We allocate
some n1 − n3 + 1 of such sets to those agents of type i1 that have not yet been allocated a set. The
remaining sets in the sequence, there are n2 of them, are allocated to agents of type i2. All sets in
the assignment are pairwise disjoint as B2n3 ⊆ C2n3 ∪ C2n3+1. Thus, the assignment we defined
gives rise to a 3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
Thus, assume that n1 = n2. In this case agents of type i3 receive B1 ∩ C1 and the sets
C2, C3, . . . , Cn3 . Agents of types i1 and i2 distribute among themselves the setsBn3+1, Bn3+2, . . . , Bn.
This is possible as the number of those sets is even, in fact, equal to 2n1 (= 2n2), and every other
set of this sequence is acceptable for agents of type i1. Since Bn3+1 ⊆ Cn3+1 ∪ Cn3+2, these
sets are disjoint with the sets assigned to agents of type i3 and, clearly, they are pairwise disjoint
themselves. It follows that this allocation gives rise to a 3
4
-sufficient allocation for C.
Case 9. None of the conditions formulated in Cases 1-8 holds.
Wemay assume that any pair of splitsA, B, C are proper relative to each other. Moreover, relabeling
the sets if necessary, we may also assume that Ai ⊆ Ci ∪ Ci+1 and Bi ⊆ Ci ∪ Ci+1. Thus, Ai and
Bi overlap and, consequently, Ai ⊆ Bi ∪ Bi+1 or Ai ⊆ Bi−1 ∪ Bi. Both cases can be dealt with
similarly, so we assume that Ai ⊆ Bi ∪Bi+1.
We note that for every i
Ci ∪ Ci+1 ∪ Ci+2 = (Ai−1 ∩ Ci) ∪ Ai ∪ (Ai+1 ∩Bi+1) ∪ (Bi+2 ∩ Ci+2).
The value of Ci ∪ Ci+1 ∪ Ci+2 for agents of type i3 is 3. The conditions formulated in Cases 1, 4
and 8 do not hold, so the sets Ai−1 ∩Ci, Ai+1 ∩Bi+1 and Bi+2 ∩Ci+2 are not acceptable for agents
of type 3. Thus, the value of Ai for agents of type i3 is larger than 3− 3 · 34 = 34 . As i was arbitrary,
it follows that every A-set is acceptable for agents of type i3.
We have n2 ≤ n1 <
⌊
n
2
⌋
, where the latter inequality holds because of Case 5 being excluded.
Since at least one in every two consecutive setsAi, Ai+1 is acceptable to agents of type i2, we assign
n2 of such sets to agents of type i2. All remaining A-sets are acceptable for agents of types i1 and
i3. Thus, they can be allocated among them arbitrarily yielding a
3
4
-satisfying allocation. 
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